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Abstract

From the question of the meaning of being to the question concerning technology, the
theme of questioning runs through the whole of Martin Heidegger’s work and plays a key role in
the development of his thought. Despite its importance, however, it is a theme that has largely
been left unexplored. This thesis is intended as the beginning of a corrective to a long overdue
examination of Heideggerian questioning. I give a close, inner-textual analysis of questioning as
it appears in Being and Time. By following Heidegger’s explicit commentary on and implicit use
of questioning, I demonstrate that the question of being [die Seinsfrage] is not a one-time
occurrence but a continuous process of opening up to genuinely new and original possibilities of
being. Such questioning takes the form of a preparing to receive and be received by being. I
“conclude” that Heidegger’s questioning is carried out in the service of a radical ontological
revolution.
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Introduction

Way and weighing
Stile and saying
On a single walk are found.

Go bear without halt
Question and default
On your single pathway bound.1

What follows is an extended engagement with the question: what is Being and Time? The
aim of this engagement is to give an interpretation of Martin Heidegger’s text as a fundamentally
creative work of questioning, one that is dedicated to radical freedom. It will be argued that by
“working out” the question of the meaning of being, Heidegger is preparing for an ontological
revolution, not in any mean or military sense, but in the manner of a meditative transformation—
a preparing to receive and be received. I reach this “conclusion” by way of a reflection on the
theme of questioning both as it appears in and pertains to the task of Being and Time.
The motivation behind this reading is twofold. For one, I hope to fill an unfortunate gap
in Heidegger scholarship. To my knowledge, there has never been published an extended
consideration of the theme of questioning in Heidegger’s work. This absence is particularly
concerning when one considers the extent of questioning’s role in nearly all of Heidegger’s texts.

Martin Heidegger, “The Thinker as Poet (Aus dear Erfahrungdes Denkens)” Martin Heidegger: Poetry,
Language, Thought, 3.
1

1

For two, I hope to confront a tendency in Heidegger scholarship to reduce his philosophic
contributions to a set of definitive statements. This tendency, which is most apparent in the
transcendentalist reading of Being and Time, covers over and hides the radicality of Heidegger’s
ambitions. Rather than see his work as revolutionary, the transcendentalist places it into the
category of disinterested philosophy. As John Caputo argues, “[Being and Time] puts Heidegger
in the position of standing back from the fray in order to isolate the functional element that
organizes, sustains, and nourishes any projection of Being.”2 Considered in this way,
Heidegger’s efforts to bring about a genuinely new beginning (what he will later call “another
beginning”3) are eclipsed.
I aim to show that the fundamental assumption underlying and (mis)informing the
transcendental narrative is a simple one; i.e. that questions necessarily precede answers, that
questions only arise when an answer is lacking, and that questions only exist as a striving for
answers. Resisting this assumption, I argue that Being and Time marks the opening of a
questioning and not its ending. Read in this way, the text should not be considered a collection of
answers but rather a careful documentation of Heidegger’s meditative preparations for
embarking on a questioning way. He does not offer definitive statements about the nature of
reality or of human being, instead he offers a sketch of his attempts to enact a questioning that
will lead to an ontological transformation.
I begin with a close examination of the opening lines of the text, the preamble placed
before the introduction, as a way to prepare a receptivity for what follows. Heidegger presents
Being and Time as a quest to work out [Ausarbeitung] the question of the meaning of being [die
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John D. Caputo, Demythologizing Heidegger, 15.
See: Martin Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy.
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Seinsfrage]. In an effort to understand what this quest entails and how it will be carried out, I
explore the context in which Heidegger situates his task. Focusing on what might be called the
double-forgetfulness of our time, the forgetting of both being and the question concerning being,
it will be shown that Heidegger’s project of working out the Seinsfrage is an attempt to bring the
question out from the oblivion of forgetfulness. Reflecting on the existential nature of this
forgetfulness, I argue that it is not conditioned upon an absence of meaning, but an obscuring
fullness. The implication being that we, as readers and interpreters, must withhold our
assumptions about the nature of questioning in order to fully appreciate what Heidegger is trying
to do. In particular, I suggest that common conceptual dynamic between questions and answers
be bracketed.
From here, the second chapter reconsiders what it means to question being. I begin by
exploring the implications of Heidegger’s brief but poignant discussion in §2 regarding the
tripartite “formal structure” of questioning in general [die Fragestellung]. I argue that
Heidegger’s illustration of questioning as an active, temporal movement is intended to draw a
link between the act of questioning and questioner carrying out this act; i.e. Dasein. Next, I
consider Heidegger’s comments on the character of questioning as a disclosive restrainedseeking. I show how questioning occurs via a hearkening that opens up to the issue at hand by
actively withholding assumption. Questioning, for Heidegger, lets beings be. From this account
of questioning in general, I move on to consider the uniqueness of the Seinsfrage in an effort to
set it apart from other questions. In so doing, I explore what Heidegger calls the “priority”
[Vorrang] of the question, and the creative possibilities that this priority brings with it. What will
be argued, is that the preeminent position of the Seinsfrage situates it discursively in such a way

3

that it has the capacity to prepare for a radical ontological transformation, of not just ourselves
but our world.
The third and final chapter will explore how the question of being is to be worked out via
an existential analysis of Dasein. It is here that I will engage most closely with the transcendental
interpretation of Being and Time. Examining the way by which a reversal of the question-answer
dynamic affects how we understand the nature of the existential analysis, I argue that the
structure of ecstatic temporality should not be read as a definitive account of what Jeff Malpas
calls “place” (as ground).4 Instead, I argue that it ought to be read as the phenomenological
unraveling of our current understanding of being. Rather than take the “conclusion” of the
analysis as a definitive transcendental topology or as the basis for a critique of the tradition, I
hold that Heidegger’s ecstatic account of Dasein is but a launching point. His decisive aim is to
manifest the question out from the horizon of temporality, and thereby open a path that will lead
(leap) away from it.
What is given here is limited to what is most fundamental to questioning and strives to
avoid being sidetracked by extensive exposition. At times it may seem that the discussion
remains too shallow and that the depth of Heidegger’s thought is not fully elaborated upon. This
is almost certainly true. That said, my intention is not to provide the final or conclusive word on
Being and Time, but to correct a misleading tendency in contemporary scholarship. At no point
do I dismiss any thinker’s views outright, nor do I wish to claim absolute authority on the
subject. I want only to instigate thoughtful dialogue and questioning. Whether I have done this
successfully will be up to the reader to decide.

4

Jeff Malpas, Heidegger’s Topology, 8.
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Ultimately, what I hope to contribute to Heidegger scholarship is a deepened appreciation
for the preparatory nature of Heidegger’s work and the “provisional” character of his claims.
Heidegger is a philosopher concerned with questions, not answers. His contributions to
philosophy do not stand as conclusive statements about reality, given in the form of enclosed
doctrine, but serve as meditations intended to foster and promote radically creative thinking. As
he writes in his essay The Question Concerning Technology, “Questioning builds a way. We
would be advised, therefore, above all to pay heed to the way, and not fix our attention on
isolated sentences and topics. The way is one of thinking.”5 This way of questioning is not
limited to a single text or period in Heidegger’s career, but is central to his entire
Gesamtausgabe. Because the nature of this task necessitates close reading, attention to language,
and a consistent resistance to assumption, this thesis is unable to explore the issue beyond the
confines of Being and Time. That said, what is presented here can be used as a foothold for
further investigation into Heidegger’s earlier and later writings. In many ways, Being and Time is
an orienting text, one that grounds our approach to his other writings by providing context from
which to understand and evaluate them. It is my hope that this thesis will serve a similar purpose.

5

Martin Heidegger, “Question Concerning Technology” Basic Writings, 311.
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Chapter I: Out of Oblivion

Being and Time opens with the declaration that, “the aim of the following treatise is to
work out [Ausarbeitung] the question of the meaning of ‘being’ [‘Sein’] and to do so
concretely.”6 This question, which Heidegger will often refer to simply as ‘the being question’
[die Seinsfrage], stands as the centerpiece of the entire work and its asking is the goal to which
the text strives. In order to begin making sense of what “working out” this question entails, this
first chapter will engage in a close reading of the opening lines of the text.
I start by speculating on the nature of forgetfulness, as the background condition on
which Heidegger situates his project. After which, I will problematize the assumption that
Heidegger’s ultimate goal is to provide a conclusive answer to the Seinsfrage. It will be argued
that this assumption is, in fact, the result of our forgetfulness and must be put into question. I
argue that Heidegger is attempting to challenge a common interpretation of the question-answer
dynamic as a sequential, unidirectional movement that endeavors to go from absence to fullness,
ignorance to knowledge, or problem to solution. It will be shown that the task of “working out”
the question of the meaning of being is not necessarily to strive after an answer but to bring the
question out from an always already implicit and dis-closive answer, that is, to manifest it. This
will ultimately prepare us for the next chapter, wherein we will analyze Heidegger’s reflections
on the nature of questioning and the distinctiveness of the Seinsfrage in an attempt to better
understand the project of Being and Time.

6

Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, xxix.
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A Perplexing Orientation
Let us begin the way Heidegger begins, with the short single-paragraph preamble placed
before the introduction. The entirety of this statement reads as follows:
“For manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when you use the
expression ‘being’ [‘seiend’]. We, however, who used to think we understood it,
have now become perplexed.” [Plato, Sophist, 244a]
Do we in our time have an answer to the question of what we really mean
by the word ‘being’ [‘seiend’]? Not at all. So it is fitting that we should raise
anew the question of the meaning of being [Sein]. But are we nowadays even
perplexed at our inability to understand the expression ‘being’ [‘Sein’]? Not at all.
So first of all we must reawaken an understanding for the meaning of this
question. The aim of the following treatise is to work out the question of the
meaning of “being” [“Sein”] and to do so concretely. The provisional aim is the
interpretation of time as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of
being.7

It is all too easy to gloss over these opening lines. For one, the points made here are both brief
and direct. They represent Heidegger at his most concise. As a result, they can be read through
quickly and absentmindedly brushed off. For two, despite their succinctness, what is said here is
not immediately palpable. Heidegger’s claims are puzzling to say the least. After all, what does
he mean that we do not understand being, nor the question concerning it? What does it mean to
“reawaken” such an understanding? And, how does time fit into all of this? Heidegger does not
attempt to explain himself here, nor does he provide much help for those of us looking to
comprehend the depth of these claims. Thus, readers may find themselves eagerly jumping past
the preamble in order to find an easier access point, something familiar and clear.

7

Ibid, xxix.
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Fleeing this perplexity and rushing past the opening statement, however, would be a
detrimental start to any reading. Not only because Heidegger offers a number of important hints
as to the nature and direction of the work, hints that must be attended to, but also because the
preamble is meant to orient us. That is, to prepare the reader for what comes after. If we have not
been properly oriented, how can we be sure that we will receive the full import of the ideas
contained within the text? Now, we might think that our confusion at what Heidegger says here
is either a failure of our comprehension or a fault of Heidegger’s communication, but this
confusion is precisely the orientation that Heidegger hopes to foster. If we are to properly engage
with the Seinsfrage, we cannot begin from a position of confident self-assurance. As Lee Braver
suggests: “Heidegger wants us to pause and fully realize our profound perplexity before this
question.”8 The reason for this will become apparent as we work through the text. For now, let us
in the spirit of fostering perplexity ruminate on the claims made here and their implications. Let
us do so with attentiveness and an open receptiveness for what is to come.

For-getting the Seinsfrage
Before we engage the content of the opening statement, we ought to take a moment to
acknowledge the author’s restrained tone. Reading through the preamble, we get the sense that
Heidegger is not writing a manifesto, nor does he seem to be setting up to dictate some revealed
doctrine of Truth. For one, he is careful to emphasize that his conclusion is only “provisional.”
For two, the only decisive claims he makes here (both of which are marked by a definitive “not
at all”) have to do with a failure of understanding that he is not explicitly exempting himself

8

Lee Braver, Heidegger, 10.
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from. What Heidegger seems to be preparing us for is less a sermon and more a meditation. He
looks to raise a question rather than answer one. The opening is an invitation to join him in
questioning.
With this in mind, then, let us then consider the two most striking pronouncements
Heidegger makes regarding the context in which his project is situated; namely, that, (1) we no
longer understand the meaning of word “being,” and that (2) we are not even perplexed by this
lack of understanding; how should we interpret these claims? In the manner of a Socratic doubleignorance, it seems Heidegger is arguing that we suffer from what might be called a doubleforgetfulness. Not only have we forgotten what it means to be, but we have also forgotten that
we have forgotten. As a result, we have become oblivious to the issue of being. Undoubtedly,
this is a strange proposition to make. How can Heidegger say the question has been forgotten
while at the same time be talking about it? What exactly has been forgotten? If speaking the
words does not constitute an act of posing of the question, nor even guarantee remembrance of it,
what does? What is the nature of this forgetfulness?
It is common to think of forgetfulness as a personal issue; i.e. as the failure of our mental
capacity to recall past memories. We say that we have forgotten something when we are unable
to bring it forward from our subconscious bank of memories to the forefront of our conscious
awareness. Forgetfulness, under such a view, is an inaccessibility. Whether this inaccessibility is
caused by the erasure of a memory, a missing memory, or is the result of a blocked, damaged or
weakened cognitive capacity to access a still intact memory, the outcome is the same; namely,
there is an absence. What we seek to recall or recollect is no longer available, no longer there.
We might think, therefore, that the situation Heidegger is describing concerns the absence of the

9

meaning of being; i.e. that the meaning, which was once accessible for recollection, is no longer
available.
Is this what Heidegger means by forgetfulness? Is our current condition indicative of an
absence? When reading any of Heidegger’s works, it is always important to be wary of
psychological or subjective interpretations. His doctoral thesis on Duns Scotus, for example, was
written as a critique of psychologism; i.e. the idea that psychological interpretations of human
being can be considered fundamental, and provide the ultimate ground of things like logic,
metaphysics, epistemology, etc. By the time he gets around to writing Being and Time this
sentiment has not diminished but deepened. The phenomenological account of Dasein contained
therein, is a deliberate attempt to dig beneath and get behind traditional accounts of ultimate
grounds in order expose a more fundamental, existential ground. In many ways, Being and Time
is a critique of the Cartesian tradition and an attempt to move away from the primacy of the
subject (be it psychological or a rational). Broadly speaking, Heidegger wants to escape the
trappings of metaphysical presupposition in order to focus on human existence as such. This
means that he is not concerned with the particular judgements and conclusions of the various
sciences (including metaphysics) but is instead focused on their prejudicial foundations.
Heidegger insists that the existential analytic of Dasein, which comprises the majority of the text,
“is prior to any psychology, anthropology, and especially biology.”9 We must, therefore, not
think of our forgetfulness in the terms employed by these realms of discourse. What Heidegger is
getting at is not a psychological problem resulting from some kind of trauma, nor is it a
subjective problem resulting from a decayed imaginative faculty, nor is it a problem of the brain,

9
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something to do with the hippocampus or neutral transmissions. For Heidegger, forgetfulness is
an existential issue.
What is more, a psychological or subjective approach to this issue of forgetfulness would
be ill equipped to deal with the magnitude of the problem. For, as Heidegger implies, the issue is
not an individual one, but a condition of “our time” [wir heute]. If the meaning of being has been
lost to the age in which we live, it does little good to think in terms of personal memory banks
and individual cognitive capacity (as if we all at one point or another understood the meaning of
being only to, one by one or all at once, lose access to it). The meaning of being has been lost to
our historical moment in time. Having been born into this era, we have been thrown into this
condition of forgetfulness. If, therefore, our forgetfulness is an existential and epochal condition,
how might we conceptualize the “absence” of understanding (both of being and the question)? 10
Firstly, we ought to clarify what is meant by existence. In Being and Time, Heidegger
essentially equates existence with human being, what he calls Dasein.11 To help avoid
misinterpretation, English translations of the text often leave the word untranslated. That said,
injecting a German word into an English text can itself be a source of confusion and lead to
misunderstanding. It is best, therefore, to straight away establish a clear definition of the term

10

The relationship between existence and history is too large of a topic to get into here. What ought to be
said about it, however, is that existence provides the foundation for the possibility of history. In Division II of Being
and Time, Heidegger explains that, “existence existentially grounds historiography as a science down to the most
inconspicuous, ‘mechanical’ procedures.” (374). Thus, when considering the historical aspect of forgetfulness, we
must be careful how we interpret the development. We must not lose sight of the ultimately existential character of
the issue. Historical timelines tend to rely upon an understanding of the human being, of time, and thereby also on
an understanding of being itself.
11
The nature of Dasein’s relationship with the human being is one of contention in Heidegger scholarship.
Whether or not the human being and Dasein are one and the same entity is a topic of discussion and not a settled
issue. That said, general consensus has it that being Dasein is identical with being human. For the sake of this thesis,
I shall not engage this debate but take the liberty of joining the majority.
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and to keep that definition close as we move forward. When translated into English, Dasein is
typically rendered in one of two ways:
(1) By breaking the word into its constitutive parts (Da meaning ‘there’ or ‘here,’ and
Sein meaning ‘being’) it can be presented as ‘being-there’ or ‘being-here.’ This is the most
common translation and is intended to convey a sense of locality. To be Dasein is not just to be,
but to be there in the world. Heidegger will use the expression being-in-the-world [In-der-Weltsein] to capture the sense of Dasein’s inner worldly situatedness. He makes clear, however, that
to be in the world is not anything like being spatially “in” some kind of a container. For him, to
be in-the-world is not to take up a position in an already existent space but is tantamount to the
initial and sustaining opening up of that space as the “there” (what Heidegger will later call
“clearing” [Lichtung]). As Heidegger explains, “by its very nature Dasein brings its there along
with it. If it lacks it’s there, it is not only factically not, but is in no sense, the being [Seiende]
which is essentially Dasein. Dasein is its disclosedness.”12 As the being that is being-there,
Dasein is the ontological condition of possibility of there being a world at all. Its disclosive
character situates it prior to, and embeds it within, any ontic situation. Michael Inwood puts it
plainly stating that “Dasein brings the whole world along with it.”13 This will be immensely
important to keep in mind as we move forward.
(2) Another, less common, translation of Heidegger’s Dasein is one that renders it simply
as “existence.” This translation matches nicely with Heidegger’s claim that, “the ‘essence’
[‘Wesen’] of Dasein lies in its existence [Existenz].”14 That said, this translation can also be
misleading. We must be careful to avoid the otherwise broad implications of the word. We often

12
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think of existence in terms of bare-existence: i.e. the brute actuality of things that underlies and
grounds their appearance—existence as objective reality. We say that the room we are in exists,
that the tree outside the window exists, that the Taj Mahal exists. To exist in the sense Heidegger
intends, however, is more akin to an awareness of being than to the state of being ‘actual.’15
Dasein exists, because it is aware of the fact that things are. Rooms, trees, and the Taj Mahal, on
the other hand lack such an awareness and therefore do not exist. For Heidegger, existence
[Existenz] must be understood in terms of disclosure, of opening up and being privy to the beings
of the world, itself included. To bolster this sense of existence, he relates the German Existenz to
the Greek ékstasis [ἔκστασις] where ék means “out” and stasis means “to stand.” From this
perspective, it can be said that to exist is to stand out into the world, among the beings of the
world. Thus, we ought not think of Dasein’s existence in metaphysical terms, as the actual, or
objective reality underlying its appearance in-the-world, but as a disclosive coming to be.
Together with the sense of Dasein as “being-there,” the notion of Dasein as “Existenz” gives it a
reflexive character. Dasein both opens the world and steps out into it.
If, therefore, forgetfulness is an existential issue, then it is an issue concerning Dasein’s
disclosive inner-worldly standing. This fact alone, however tells us very little about the nature of
our forgetfulness. The issue is still very abstract. What is it about this existential out-standing
that has helped to bring about our current condition?

15
Note: I use the word awareness here in order to help differentiate brute existence from existenz. This
awareness, however, is not the awareness of a subjectivity that is conscious, but the disclosive sense of a seeing, or
being privy to beings as what they are, in truth. Interestingly, the English word “aware” comes to us from the Old
English “gewær” which, when broken into its constitutive parts (“ġe-“ and “wær”) can be translated as “the process
of truth(ing).”
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Heidegger elaborates on the nature of Dasein, arguing that “understanding of being
[Seinsverständnis] is itself a determination of the being of Dasein.”16 For Heidegger, our
disclosive relationship with the beings of the world (in the sense of a coming to be, an outstanding) is made possible by an understanding of being [Seinsverständnis], which is the basic
condition of possibility of existence. Beings always come to be as what they are.
This understanding relationship to being finds its most clear expression in our use of
language. Every sentence we write or utter aloud includes some sort of reference to being, either
in the use of an explicit copula or an implicit one. When we say things like “where are my
keys?” or “the restaurant on the corner is excellent” we presuppose the meaning of the “is” and
the “are.” Even when we leave out the copula it is still covertly there. Giving a directive like
“turn off the light” presumes that there is a light to turn off and what the light is. As William J.
Richardson puts it:
Even before posing the question [of being], man has some comprehension of Being. No
matter how dark or obscure Being itself may be to him, still in his most casual discourse
with other beings, they are sufficiently open to him that he may experience that they are,
concern himself about what they are, sc. their Being.17

To be clear, this presumption of being is present even outside of our use of language. When I
climb the stairs to my apartment, for example, I assume that the stairs are there, that they are
stairs, and that they will continue to be there with every step I take. It is not just when writing or
speaking that an understanding of being is present. All of our activities, questioning included, are
carried out by way of this presumptive understanding of, and reliance on, being.

16
17

Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 11.
William J. Richardson. Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, 33.
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Now, we must be careful to avoid thinking about this understanding in any kind of
cognitive or conscious sense. What Heidegger tries to make clear throughout the text, is that this
understanding (as existential) is fundamentally disclosive. It brings things into being, and is not
something projected onto an already disclosed being. Ultimately, this means that our
forgetfulness, as a form of existence, is also predicated upon a disclosive understanding of being.
The question, therefore, is: how so?
For Heidegger, the disclosure of existence does not necessitate nor ensure authentic
being. In fact, disclosure most often occurs inauthentically, meaning that the revealing of
existence is also a concealing. For Heidegger, the obvious is often obfuscating; that is, despite
the clarity with which beings are presented, what is most proper or true to their being can be
covered over by their very being. When we take something to be obvious, we tend to pay no
heed to it, our attention is largely directed elsewhere. As we get caught up in our everyday
engagements with the various beings in the world, we tend to lose sight of the simple fact that
they are in the first place. The ontological is eclipsed by the ontic, or as Heidegger puts it: “what
is ontically nearest and familiar is ontologically the farthest, unrecognized and constantly
overlooked in its ontological significance.”18 We forget being by perpetually presupposing it. Put
in worldly and historical terms, the presuppositions regarding being that inform and make
possible the meaningful appearance of things that we, today, all live by are hidden by the
appearances of these things themselves. Understood in this way, the “absence” of the meaning of
being is not a lack of meaning, but the result of an obscuring fullness.

18
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We might, therefore, follow Richard Polt and think of our forgetfulness as a for-getfullness (forgetting as a getting-before).19 From this perspective, we have for-gotten the meaning
of being and the Seinsfrage because we presume to know what they are. Our understanding of
the meaning of being and our understanding of the Seinsfrage are both obscured by the same
presumptive inattentiveness. This is perhaps what Heidegger is trying to indicate when he tells us
that we are not even “perplexed at our inability to understand the expression ‘being.’” We are not
perplexed because of the dis-closive way we as Dasein exist in the world. Like a fish that is not
perplexed about his emergence in water, we are not perplexed by our emergence in being. As
Polt explains:
Things in general are simply available and present. We take them for granted: we
do not recognize them either as something taken or as something granted. In
ordinary experience we rely on beings, use them, and refer to them, without
reflecting on the fact that they are accessible in the first place. Just as we
automatically expect the ground to support us when we take a step, we count on
the subsistence of the whole of beings in our every act. […] we take the whole for
granted as reliable and thus for-get it.20

In taking being for granted, we also take for granted what it means to ask about it. What
Heidegger wants us to take away from this, therefore, is a profound appreciation for the fact that
we do not know what we think we know. He wants us to allow ourselves to become perplexed so
that we might properly attend to both being and the question concerning it. Again, we must be
careful not to interpret this inattentiveness as an individual phenomenon. It is not the case that
every single person in the world is inattentive to being because of a rampant failure of some

19
20

Richard Polt, The Emergency of Being: On Heidegger’s ‘Contributions to Philosophy,’ Location 683.
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cognitive capacity to attend to things. For Heidegger, this is an existential problem and as such is
one that find expression in our shared world.21
Returning to the preamble, we find Heidegger claiming that we must “reawaken” [zu
wecken] an understanding for the meaning of the Seinsfrage. Metaphorically, this suggests that
our forgetfulness is akin to being asleep. It gives the image of a dormant or unconscious
understanding; an understanding that is there but has become concealed. If this is indeed the
case, then to “reawaken” an understanding for the meaning of the Seinsfrage is not to make a
new discovery, nor to create a new understanding, but to activate a latent possibility, to bring it
out of oblivion into the immediacy of the there.
It is important to always keep in mind that, while Heidegger’s use of language in Being
and Time is deliberate and systematic, it is also colloquial. He is not only attempting to construct
a new lexicon of technical terms capable of addressing a wide array of phenomenological
experiences and events, he is also attempting to deepen our appreciation for the poetic richness
of everyday language. Many of the words that he uses are familiar to the average speaker. They
are words used in everyday discourse, typically without a second thought (i.e. “Dasein”). By
implementing them in somewhat unconventional ways and by highlighting their historical and
etymological connotations, Heidegger wants to show that by being attentive to the language we
use every day we can be deepen our understanding of our existential situation. As readers, we
would do well pay close attention to the full sense and significance of each word, even those
words that would seem ordinary and uninteresting.
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With this in mind, let us consider his use of reawakening: “zu wecken.” In German,
wecken essentially means ‘to waken’ or ‘to awaken,’ and in this sense the English is not far off.
It means to rouse from sleep or to cease sleeping; it is to move from the dormant to the active.
Zu, on the other hand, can mean a number of things. Most significant of its meanings is the sense
it evokes of heading ‘to’ or ‘being towards.’ Much like the English preposition ‘to,’ Zu indicates
movement, both spatial (in the sense of moving toward something) and temporal (in the sense of
moving forward in time, futurally). For example, “Ich fahre zu einem Freund von mir” translates
as “I am going to see a friend at his place.” A person making this statement would not, at the
moment, be there with the friend, but is on the way there.
In Joan Stambaugh’s translation “zu wecken” is rendered as “reawaken.” This implies
repetition and return. Without questioning the importance of such a connotation, it must be
acknowledged that zu wecken also implies that this return involves some form of movement, of
being-toward something. We might, therefore, think of Heidegger’s intention to reawaken an
understanding for the question of being as a journey towards the wakeful activity of such
questioning. An awakened understanding for the meaning of the Seinsfrage is not “here” but
there, not now but then. From this we might surmise that to be in the position of forgetfulness is
to have wandered away from our understanding of the question. The temporal aspect of the
being-toward of zu, alongside the epochal character of our forgetfulness, seems to suggest that
we have historically moved away from an understanding of the Seinsfrage.
Interestingly, zu can also be used as an adverb to mean ‘closed’ or ‘locked.’ The phrase
“das Geschäft war zu,” for example means “the shop was closed,” while “die Tür ist zu” means
“the door is locked.” In the case of zu wecken, the connotation would be that our wakefulness is
closed or locked. Together with the sense of forgetfulness as a dormant understanding, the
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notion of a locked understanding is perhaps also important here. From this perspective, our
forgetfulness is conditioned, not only on a distance, but also a closure. For Heidegger, we have
been closed off from an awakened understanding of being and its question. Our existential
condition is such that being and its question have been dis-closed to us in an inauthentic manner,
hiding their true being.22 To reawaken our understanding, in a process of remembrance, is not
only to set out on a journey towards wakefulness, but also to unlock and open-up the more
authentic understanding hiding behind itself. Rather than see the absence of understanding as a
nothingness, therefore, we might better see it as a closure, and the result of a blockage or
impasse.
Here, we find ourselves in a real predicament. How can we reawaken an understanding
for the meaning of this question when we are not in control of the way the question itself is
disclosed to us? What path must we follow in order to awaken our understanding and properly
pose the Seinsfrage? Setting aside the question of proper procedure for now, letting it ruminate in
the background as we move forward, let us now consider what this for-get-fullness means in the
context of questioning being.

Questioning Dynamics
Ostensibly, to pose any question is a simple and straightforward procedure. We simply
utter it aloud or to ourselves and voilà, mission accomplished. Of course, finding answers to our
questions might be difficult, but raising them should not require any strenuous effort. The idea
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that we need to “reawaken” an understanding of the question seems to problematize an otherwise
simple task. Considering the sense of forgetfulness that has emerged in our discussion, however,
it is perhaps the case that this obvious sense of questioning is part of the problem. If so, how
should we think about questioning?
Implicit in the common way of thinking about questions is a sense that questions only
come to be in and as a striving after answers. Questions represent a desire for answers. We might
say that questioning is an act of being-toward-answer (to imitate a Heideggerian neologism).
This question-answer dynamic is sequential, unidirectional, and is not reversible. Indeed, why
would anyone raise a question if they already had an answer? In the same way that it makes little
sense to eat with a full stomach, it makes little sense to question when an answer is already
present.
This assumption regarding the question-answer dynamic is not only prevalent in the
common, everyday world of the average person, it can also be found in the work of the most
advanced analytic philosophers. Dutch logicians Jeroen Groenendijk and Martin Stokhof, for
example, argue that questioning can be understood as a kind of input-output interaction, wherein
a questioner aims to acquire information from an interlocutor. For Groenendijk and Stokhof,
“these interactions constitute a discourse which explicitly aims at information exchange.”23
Questions under this view are requests, and answers are requests-fulfilled. Questions, therefore,
come logically prior to answers. In a similar vein, John Searle argues that questioning is an
illocutionary speech act characterized as a request for information.24
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This way of conceptualizing the activity of questioning, in terms of information
exchange, puts questions into the service of answers. We pose (questions) only to ex-pose
(answers). In their servitude, questions exist only to destroy themselves. Tasked with acquiring
information, the question is an opening onto a path of self-destruction. For once the desired
information has been acquired, and the question answered, there is no longer any need to send
out the request. The exchange has been carried out and the market closed. In this way,
questioning is understood as a self-destructive movement.
Under the auspices of this assumption, Heidegger’s project of “working out” the
Seinsfrage is interpreted as an attempt to open the question in order to then close it. The
forgetfulness of the question is only incidental to the forgetfulness of being, which is the real
problem. As Richard Capobianco argues, “Heidegger’s original and sustaining concern is with
Being.”25 Being and Time, then, is interpreted as a work of ontology (albeit a unique form of
ontology). Its focus is on being. What is sought is a conclusive statement about being. The
question is only useful as a throughway to acquiring an answer.
This is not an uncommon interpretation of Heidegger’s project. If we extend the earlier
cited quote by Lee Braver, for example, we see that he prefaces himself claiming that, “before
answering the question can even be a possibility, Heidegger wants us to pause and fully realize
our profound perplexity before the question.”26 Before answering the question. In this view, the
question inaugurates a striving after an answer and is only fulfilled when one is discovered. The
issue of reawakening does not involve rethinking questioning in general, but rethinks the path to
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an answer. It is a careful consideration of the unique aspects of the Seinsfrage that make it
difficult to ex-pose.
Braver is certainly not alone in this. Hannah Arendt, for example, argues that Heidegger’s
account of ecstatic temporality (as provided in Division Two of Being and Time) constitutes a
“provisional and inherently unintelligible answer [to the question of the meaning of being].”27
According to Arendt, Being and Time is not preparatory to posing the Seinsfrage, but constitutes
an example of its being posed and answered. For her, the text is an attempt to rescue the concept
of being from Kantian destruction, that is, “to reestablish an ontology.”28
Jeff Malpas (a proponent of the transcendental interpretation of Heidegger’s work), too,
claims that the Seinsfrage, “is answered by looking to an analysis of the structure of the mode of
being of a particular being—the being for whom being is itself in question and to which
Heidegger gives the name (at least in this work) Dasein.”29 For Malpas, the topographical
account of Dasein given via the existential analysis is Heidegger’s “answer” to the Seinsfrage.
While it does not arrive in the form of “being is X” it is an answer in the sense that it grounds all
possible “answers.” The question, for him, is posed without difficulty at the beginning of the
text.
Similarly, William J. Richardson argues that Heidegger’s purpose with Being and Time is
“to lay the groundwork for metaphysics.”30 The existential analysis, he argues, is an attempt to
establish the conditions of possibility of any and all thinking about being. And so, while
metaphysics has always been the product of a finite perspective, its underlying conditions have
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remained the same. For Richardson, to work out the Seinsfrage, “is to discern
phenomenologically this finite comprehension of Being and reveal its ultimate sense.”31 This
“ultimate sense” amounts to an answering of the Seinsfrage.
To interpret the project of Being and Time in this way is to situate it within a long
tradition of attempting to answer the question—what does it mean to be? In so doing, however,
the question inevitably arises: why do we need to reawaken an understanding for the question?
Have we not been raising it for centuries? Certainly, there are plenty of philosophers, both past
and present, working on metaphysical and ontological questions concerning being. There have
been and continue to be countless books published purporting to provide answers to these
questions. Plato, for example, argues that being is Idea, the purest of which is the idea of the
good [ἡτοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα], Aristotle gives it manifold meanings, Plotinus argues that it is one,
Spinoza calls it substance [substantia], Leibniz splits it into monads, Descartes divides it into
immaterial [res cogitans] and physical substance [res extensia], Schopenhauer calls it will and
representation [Wille und Vorstellung], Hegel calls it the absolute [das Absolute], and Nietzsche
calls it the will to power [Wille zur Macht]. What would a Heideggerian ontology have to offer
that others failed to deliver?
To explain why these efforts are inadequate and misguided, proponents of the ontological
reading of Being and Time (a reading which claims Heidegger’s efforts are directed towards the
exposure of an answering) often refer to Heidegger’s account of the ontological difference: i.e.
the notion that “the being of being ‘is’ itself not a being.”32 The difference, as it is presented in
Being and Time, seems to function as a way of problematizing the tradition. Heidegger is arguing
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that being [das Sein], as such and in general, cannot be understood in terms of any one being
[das Seiende]. That something is, is not reducible to what something is. Anytime a claim is made
about being, in the form of “being is X”, being is presupposed, pushed back via the copula, and
thereby evades our efforts of determination. And so, when metaphysicians try to conceptualize
being in order to present some ultimate statement about it, their accounts are inevitably reductive
and fall short of the goal. To make this mistake is to fail to recognize that being is the condition
of all possibility and is thereby relentlessly prior to any claims made about it. Reading the
ontological difference in this way, the question of the meaning of being is presented as the
“problem of being.”33 And, as with any problem (question), it is just waiting to be solved
(answered).
Indeed, understanding Heidegger’s project in this way is not uncommon. The narrative is
well-worn. While it is an undoubtedly fair route to take, and one that has led and continues to
lead to many fruitful readings, it does not seem to fully appreciate the depth of our forgetfulness.
If we want to take seriously Heidegger’s claim that we need to reawaken an understanding for
the meaning of the Seinsfrage, then we must also be skeptical of the assumption that its aim is to
search for an answer. We must take seriously the prospect that our assumptions about
questioning cover over a more genuine understanding of what questioning is and thereby
contribute to our state of double for-get-fullness.
We may wonder, though, what exactly is at stake here. In short, it is not only the integrity
of our engagement with Being and Time, that is at risk, but also our engagement with
Heidegger’s entire Gesamtausgabe. For many readers and commentators, Being and Time is
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Heidegger’s magnum opus. As such, it often orients our readings of the rest of his works. It is
not only the first text that many read, but, considered as the centerpiece of his lifelong project, it
is thought to gravitationally unite his disparate work on the themes of art and technology,
language and history. The scope of the ontological reading’s influence, therefore, is not limited
to Being and Time, but creeps into our interpretations of Heidegger’s earlier and later work as
well.
One way that it does this, is through the argument that the unfinished character of Being
and Time stands as a testament to Heidegger’s failure to provide a conclusive answer. Indeed,
Heidegger never published the projected third division of the first part to be entitled “Time and
Being.” Nor did he complete the second half of the work, which was to be an extensive reversereading of the tradition, from Kant through Descartes to Aristotle. Eventually, the label “First
Half,” which adorned the first few editions of the work, was removed from subsequent editions.
As Dennis Schmidt tells us in the foreword to the text, “[Being and Time] is a torso of its own
intentions and the fragment of a larger project.”34
This failure is said not to have discouraged the philosopher; instead, it is considered a
productive failure. The now infamous “turn” in Heidegger’s thought is often interpreted as the
abandonment of his ontological project and the metaphysical language that motivated it. This
abandonment is not a complete abandonment but a “turning away” from the trappings of his
earlier approach towards a new, more poetic approach that focuses less on the (all too
metaphysical) concept of being than it does on notions of art, technology, language and history.
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This shift in direction is read as a kind of lesson learned, and that Heidegger’s later writings are
interpreted as the fruits of his failure.
Jacques Derrida, for example, argues that the incompleteness of Being and Time can be
explained as a "running out of breath [essoufflement]."35 For him, Heidegger was unable to finish
the project because he ran up against the limits of his “metaphysical” vocabulary. The idea is that
after discovering the limits of his language, Heidegger abandoned talk of being as such and in
general (which is too easily misconstrued as being-ness) and attempted to expand his vocabulary
in order to surpass these limitations. Unfortunately, for Derrida, Heidegger’s allegiance to the
language of metaphysics never allowed him to fully rid himself of his metaphysical baggage.
The idea that Being and Time is a productive failure is certainly compelling. It is
undoubtedly true that Heidegger’s later writings differ from his earlier ones; yet, we must resist
the notion that that these are two radically different Heidegger’s (a Heidegger I and Heidegger II
as Richardson likes to classify them). For, as Heidegger himself tells us in the preface to the
seventh edition, “[Being and Time’s] path still remains a necessary one even today, if the
question of being is to move our Dasein.”36 Before we can make any definitive conclusions about
Heidegger’s “failure” and subsequent “turn” we must properly understand the ambitions of Being
and Time, and on a background of double-forgetfulness, we must be wary of our own
assumptions about what the project entails. Heidegger’s aim is to “work out” the question of the
meaning of being. Let us now consider more closely what he means to accomplish.
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Working Out the Seinsfrage
If to “work out” the Seinsfrage is not necessarily an attempt to answer the question, what
else could it be? What does it mean to “work out” the question if not to search for an answer to
it? Paying close attention to Heidegger’s language, we notice that the word he uses is
“Ausarbeitung.” Translated into English as “work out,” the richness of the original is obscured.
In English, the word “work” connotes the accomplishment of a task and the actualization of a
possibility through labour. It is a broad term that can be applied to any kind of task or job, from
the mundane to the extraordinary. A student works on their math homework, just as a politician
works on restoring the economy. In German, the word “arbeiten,” can certainly be translated as
“work,” but does not refer simply to the accomplishment of a task or the actualizing of a
possibility (as the German “werken” does). Rather, arbeit is the labour by which we earn a
living. It is the ongoing activity of self-preservation and endurance. It is a hardship that takes
time and effort. It can be exhausting but is also rewarding. In everyday discourse, German
speakers will often use the word arbeit to refer to one’s vocation. It is not just a one-time job,
something to be accomplished and set aside, but is rather like a calling. Ausarbeitung, therefore,
carries with it the weight of an enduring commitment. In this sense, to work out the question of
the meaning of being is not something we do once and then put behind us, nor is it like a chore
that we perform every now and again when necessary. It is a calling, something that spans an
entire lifetime. It is not the striving after some destination, not a matter of arrival, but a way of
living and of earning a living.
If this is what Heidegger intends to convey with regard to the act of questioning, then
what does this mean for our understanding of the question-answer dynamic and the assumption
that to pose the question is to strive after an answer? We tend to think of answers as destinations.
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If what Heidegger is trying to achieve is an “Ausarbeitung,” however, we should not think of this
a simple journey from point A to point B, nor should we think of it as an attempt to close the
question. And yet, it is hard to imagine a questioning that does not involve an attempt at
answering. Why are the two so closely associated? What is the relationship of the question and
answer? How are we to understand the dynamic link between the two?
We have spent some time contemplating the nature of the question but have not said
much about the nature of the answer. Perhaps, if we are to develop our understanding of the
question-answer dynamic, it would be prudent to ask: what is an answer?
Heidegger offers a clue as to the essence of an answer when he writes: “in conformity to
its most proper sense, the answer [to the question of being] provides a directive for concrete
ontological research, that is, a directive to begin its investigative inquiry within the horizon
exhibited—and that is all it provides.”37 Here, it is clear that the answer is not the final
conclusion of the inquiry, not the destination, but rather the “guiding directive” for inquiry. The
answer, in a sense, is situated prior to the question. Indeed, as was discussed earlier, it is only on
the basis of having an answer, in the form of a preliminary understanding of being
[Seinsverstandnis], that we can question being in the first place. We might say, it is not the
question that begets an answer but the answer that begets the question. In this way, Heidegger
looks to reverse the commonsense question-answer dynamic (at least as it applies to the
Seinsfrage) in order to reprioritize the question. The issue, therefore, is not that an answer is
lacking, quite the opposite. It is that the question is lacking, forgotten.
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Heidegger extends this sentiment in a letter to Richardson, published as the foreword to
his book Heidegger: From Phenomenology to Thought, writing, “I hesitate with my answers, for
they are necessarily no more than indications [Hinweise].”38 The German word he uses here is
Hinweise, which can be translated as indication but can also mean “hint.” From this we can see
that even if Heidegger were attempting to answer the Seinsfrage, any answer given would not be
definitive. Instead it would serve as a hint, an indicator or guide. To answer the Seinsfrage is not
to solve the problem of being, but to give clues. It is to pro-pose a general direction, not a
specific path. Here again, we find Heidegger utilizing the language of a journey. Indeed, to
reawaken [zu wecken] an understanding for the meaning of being is to embark on a journey, to
provide answers is to guide that journey towards reawakening.
On a background of for-get-fullness, we can now begin to see that the task of “working
out” the Seinsfrage is not founded on the lack of an answer, on an absence, but on the positive
fullness of an already functioning (albeit implicit) answer. In light of this, therefore, we can
begin to see how, for Heidegger, the question-answer dynamic of the Seinsfrage is different than
we commonly think about it. Heidegger’s question is founded on the existence of a previously
given answer, a giving before. This answer underlies all of our projects and activities, our
thoughts and our actions; every moment of our lives, form the mundane to the extraordinary, is
conditioned by it.
We might, at this point, wonder whether there is a contradiction in Heidegger’s reversal
of the question-answer dynamic. In the opening lines of the preamble, Heidegger tells us that we
no longer understand what we mean by the word ‘being.’ Not at all. If it is true, then, that the
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question arises after the answer, would this not mean that an understanding of being is not
actually absent at all? Is this not a contradiction?
In short, there is no contradiction here; however, the point is a subtle one. Recall that our
forgetfulness is founded on a full understanding of being. The answer to the question of the
meaning of being, which underlies our everyday being in the world and the projects that we take
up within the world, is rarely made explicit. This meaning resides in the disclosure of being. It
lives in our assumptions. We take it for granted. Thus, the lack of an answer is not a genuine
absence, but the absence of an obscuring. Heidegger addresses this concern in the introduction
when he writes:
Beings can be determined in their being without the explicit concept of the meaning of
being having to be already available. If this were not so there could not have been as yet
any ontological knowledge. […] Presupposing being has the character of taking a
preliminary look at being in such a way that on the basis of this look beings that are
already given are tentatively articulated in their being.39

For the question to arise out from an answer, it need not be the case that the answer is expressed
in a clear and straightforward statement about being. Being need not be clearly defined. As
Heidegger tells us, “an enigma lies a priori in every relation and being towards beings as beings.
The fact that we live already in an understanding of being and that the meaning of being is at the
same time shrouded in darkness proves the fundamental necessity of retrieving the question of
the meaning of ‘being.’”40
Returning, then, to the question of the meaning of Ausarbeitung we find that the
committed labour of “working out” the question is not carried out in a closing off of the question,
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but in manifesting the question—of bringing it out of the oblivion of forgetfulness. Understood
in this way, the “out” of work out (the “aus” of Ausarbeitung) must not be thought of as a
“putting out” or an extinguishing, but rather as a bringing out, an issuing or a manifesting.41 In
the existential sense of disclosure, Heidegger looks to work out the Seinsfrage from under the
coverings of an otherwise inauthentic dis-closure.

Recollection
This chapter gave an interpretation of the opening lines of Being and Time. My close
reading of Heidegger’s preamble was intended to orient further reading, and to establish a
foothold (of sorts) from which to launch an interpretation of the text and its project. By lingering
on the preamble, reading carefully, we discovered that Heidegger’s task is perhaps not what it
appears to be at first glance.
For Heidegger, the existential conditions of our time are such that we have forgotten what
we mean by the word ‘being.’ To make matters worse, we fail to even be perplexed by this fact.
By arguing that we are in a position of double-forgetfulness, a kind of Socratic double-ignorance,
Heidegger intends to prepare us for a questioning that arises from presumption by putting those
presumptions into doubt. Thus, the opening lines of Being and Time are not intended to orient its
readers in the traditional sense of contextualizing and situating the project in relation to the
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tradition, but rather by manifesting a deep sense of perplexity. The only way to “reawaken” the
question of being is to first recognize that our understanding is asleep.
For, as we discovered, to forget being is to for-get it. According to Heidegger, our sleepy
understanding is not to be understood as an absence of understanding but an obscuring fullness
of understanding. We have for-gotten being by presuming and presupposing it in everything that
we do, questioning included. Thus, we are no longer granted any certainty regarding our
expectations about the Seinsfrage. The all too common assumption that Heidegger is trying to
answer the question of being must be questioned. In so doing, we must also problematize the
readings of prominent Heidegger scholars and commentators, including the likes of Lee Braver,
Hannah Arendt, Jeff Malpas, and William J. Richardson. From this position of perplexity and
doubt, a question is beginning to form; i.e. the question of questioning. What does it mean to
question for Heidegger? If questioning is not a striving for answers (being-toward-answer), what
is it?
Our initial musings on this question and consideration of Heidegger’s language (zu
wecken, Ausarebeitung, etc…), it was argued that to “work out” the Seinsfrage, for Heidegger, is
not necessarily to strive after an answer, but to resist the closure of an already implicit answer.
To work out the question requires a level of restraint that is not found in the ordinary
understanding of questioning. Such hasty groping after answers is doomed to fall into the
repetitive pattern of forgetfulness. Heidegger’s task of working out the Seinsfrage is, therefore,
no simple task. It is more like a long and difficult labour, a calling, by which we make manifest
the Seinsfrage. This, of course, does not tell us exactly what is involved in the labour of working
out the question, but it does provide a hint as to the direction we ought to move towards.

32

Our next section will attempt to give shape to an understanding of what questioning
means for Heidegger and how it functions in the overall project of Being and Time. We will first
consider the formal structure of questioning, looking at some of the comments Heidegger makes
about it, which will then lead into a discussion of the existential analytic of Dasein (of which the
majority of the text is comprised), followed by a meditation on the relationship of Dasein’s
being-there and questioning.
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Chapter II: Into the Open

In the first chapter I suggested that Heidegger’s project of “working out” the Seinsfrage,
is not an attempt to answer the question, but to bring it out from behind the coverings of an
already implicit answer. The question we now face is: what does this mean for how we interpret
Being and Time and Heidegger’s wider philosophical project? In attempting to address this
question, two further questions arise: (1) what exactly is Heidegger working out? (i.e. what is the
Seinsfrage?), and (2) how does this working out take place? (i.e. what is involved in the process
of working out [Ausarbeitung]?).
The remainder of this thesis will be dedicated to addressing these questions. It will be
divided into two chapters. The first will mine Heidegger’s introductory remarks on questioning
in order to get a better sense of what questioning, as such and in general, entails. It will be argued
that questioning is not merely an action carried out by an otherwise unaffected questioner but is a
mode of Dasein’s being. In so doing, I will show that Heidegger characterizes questioning as
disclosure via restrained-seeking; i.e. a receptive openness to the issue in question. This will be
followed by a discussion regarding the eminence of the question concerning being, and how it
can be set apart from other questions. It will be argued that the Seinsfrage is a way of being
wherein Dasein fundamentally opens up to the issue (issuing) of being as such and in general,
and that such openness is preparatory to a free, creative transformation from the ground up. This
will lead into the third chapter where I will consider how the Seinsfrage is to be worked out. An
interpretation of the existential analytic, as Heidegger’s chosen path to work out or manifest an
openness to the issue of being will be given there.
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Opening an Issue
Earlier, we considered the possibility that Heidegger’s project of working out
[Ausarbeitung] the question of the meaning of being is not necessarily a unidirectional, striving
movement from absence to fullness, ignorance to knowledge, problem to solution; i.e. question
to answer. This, however, left us wondering what the Seinsfrage truly is. Let us now work to
develop a richer sense of the question as Heidegger understands it; namely, what it is, how it
works, where, when and why it can/should be posed.
Before attempting to capture what is unique about this question, we would be wise to first
consider the claims Heidegger makes about questioning in general. In so doing, we must be
attentive, not only to Heidegger’s careful use of language, but also to the often implicit, though
necessary, assumptions that inform our own thought (as well as our lives more generally). If we
are not necessarily permitted the assumption that questions inaugurate a being-toward-answer,
then how should we think about them? What might a question look like if it is not directed
toward the ex-posure of an answering? How would such questioning function? Why should we
engage in it? Would it not be a futile gesture? In order to appropriately respond to these
questions, we should perhaps start with the more basic question: what is questioning?
Indeed, this is the same place that Heidegger starts. As he tells us, “to retrieve the
question of being means first of all to work out adequately the formulation of the question [die
Fragestellung].”42 Engaging with the question concerning questioning, therefore, Heidegger
proposes a formal structure of general questioning comprised of three key moments, what he
calls: the Gefragtes, Befragtes, and Erfragtes, or that which is asked about, that which is
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interrogated, and that which is to be ascertained, respectively.43 Reflecting on this structure, two
characteristics immediately stand out.
(1) Although it is conceptually divided into three, none can be meaningfully separated
from the others and left to stand on its own. It is a tri-unitary structure. For to ask about
something, something must also be interrogated, and something must also be sought. An
interrogation would make little sense without a topic of concern or a goal. Altogether, they give
form and shape to questioning. Their unity is indicated by the fact that each of the three words
share a common root. By adding different prefixes to the word “fragen” [“questioning”],
Heidegger intends to capture the unity of these three key elements of questioning while at the
same time illustrating their distinct aspects.
It is also important to note that the emphasis of these terms is not necessarily on their
respective objects per se but on the action of interacting with their objects. While there certainly
is some-thing asked about, some-thing interrogated, and some-thing to be gained, we must not
forget that “fragen” is a verb. Gefragtes refers to the action of having been asking. Befragtes
refers to the immediate action of asking or interrogating, and Erfragtes is the continuing action
of asking towards a goal. Heidegger is not saying that questioning is a collection of three distinct
beings, but that it is an activity of relating to said beings. Each prefix indicates an aspect of an
otherwise singular activity.
(2) In addition to the active, tri-unitary aspect of questioning, Heidegger also wants to
acknowledge its temporal character. The “Ge-“ of Gefragtes, for example, indicates past tense
(although it does not necessarily entail completion); the “Be-“ of Befragtes indicates present

43

Ibid, 4.

36

tense (a working on something or the changing of a state), and the “Er-“ of Erfragtes indicates
future tense (the attainment of something to come). Altogether, this structure gives a sense of
questioning as a durational movement. For Heidegger, questioning is not something that happens
in one frozen moment but is something that occurs in and through time. It is a dynamic, triunitarily structured, temporal activity, carried out in relation to beings.
As such, questioning ought not be seen as something objectively present and describable,
an object of science, but as an activity performed by a questioning-being. More specifically, the
fact that it is carried out in relation to beings suggests that this questioning-being must be privy
to being in the existential sense, thus indicating that questioning is a possibility afforded to
Dasein alone. To ask about beings, to interrogate beings, and to ascertain beings, requires a
preliminary understanding-relationship to those beings. One must be in a world to question it. As
Heidegger will say of the Seinsfrage, “[it is] nothing else than the radicalization of an essential
tendency of being that belongs to Dasein itself.”44
Indeed, as Being and Time unfolds it will become clear that the temporal structure of
questioning is not only constitutive of questioning but is structurally fundamental to the
existence of Dasein and thereby informs all of the varied modes of its being-in-the-world.45 In
this way, we can see the formal structure of questioning as Heidegger’s attempt to demarcate a
link between Dasein (as temporal existence) and questioning (as temporal activity). This
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ultimately means that questioning, as a mode of Dasein’s existence, is fundamentally disclosive.
Through the activity of questioning, a world emerges in which Dasein as questioner finds itself
immersed and engaged with the beings circumspectly surrounding it. We shall discuss the
importance of this in greater detail in the third chapter.
Before we move on, however, we ought to pause and take note of the fact that the
translation of “die Fragestellung” as “formulation of the question,” although appropriate, can be
misleading. Firstly, the suffix “-ung” indicates that the word is a noun crafted from a verb. As
such it is a way of speaking directly about an action without implying that it is the action of some
objective entity. What is more, although it is a noun, die Fragestellung is not a static object,
place or thing, but a kind of action. To maintain this sense of continuing action we might be
better off translating it as “formulating” (i.e. as “the formulating of the question”) rather than
“formulation,” which implies completion and accomplishment.
Secondly, the word “formulation” also carries with it a sense of repetition and strict
adherence to a rule. Mathematical rules, for example, are expressed as formulas. Indeed, any
action carried out in an unchanging and repetitive manner is said to be formulaic. In German,
however, “stellen” has a much less rigid sense. As a verb, it is used to mean “posing, positioning,
placing, putting, setting or adjusting.” “Kann ich dir eine Frage stellen?” for example, translates
as “can I pose a question to you?” or “can I put a question to you?” With this in mind, we might
translate the task of working out [Ausarbeitung] the Fragestellung as “the labour of making
manifest the question-posing.” Heidegger’s concern is with the activity of posing a question and
the functioning of its active structure. Thus, his account of the “formal structure” [Die formale
Struktur] of questioning cannot necessarily be interpreted as an unchanging, fixed and formulaic
structure, but an attempt to capture the way questioning emerges and is disclosed to us.
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Heidegger’s description of questioning concerns the way questioning occurs for us and by us
today.
As was hinted at in the first section, answers are not conclusive statements, the crowning
achievements of a successfully closed questioning, but are better understood as guides or launch
points for further questioning. And so, we should not treat the Fragestellung, Heidegger’s
answer to the question of questioning, as a definitive and conclusive formula. By laying out a
formal structure, he is not necessarily attempting to give a definitive, unchanging account of
questioning. He is not trying to expose the platonic idea of questioning, or to establish a rule
(formula) that all questioning must follow for all time. Considering the ontic way Heidegger
describes the formal structure of questioning, outlining it in brief with a single paragraph, we
should perhaps think of his description as a provisional starting point, as Heidegger’s attempt to
open the issue of questioning, rather than settle it.

Forward Forholding
The structure of question-posing relates questioning to Dasein, as a form of Dasein’s
occurrence. This fact alone, however, tells us very little about what Heidegger means by
questioning, how it functions, what it accomplishes, and its general significance. Questioning is a
way of being(in-the-world); it is an existential activity. What, though, sets it apart from Dasein’s
other activities?
It is common to view questioning as a purely linguistic exercise; i.e. as one form of
discursive activity, among many, that we may or may not choose to carry out. Under such a
view, sentences ending in question marks or an inflected tone function in much the same way as
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sentences that end in periods or exclamation points. These sentences are uttered by a being that is
untouched by them. They emerge from the speaker as a kind of byproduct that, once expelled, is
detached from them. It thus becomes like a tool, ready to be picked up and used for a specific
purpose.
In an economy of information, for example, questioning is only set apart from other
linguistic expressions by the fact that it indicates an absence of “information” and marks a
request for that information. Statements, on the other hand, are indicative of information
possessed. On such a view, questions are distinct sorts of communication tools that can be used
should the present situation call for it; questioning is the active use of a tool. As a miner uses a
hammer-tool rather than a spoon-tool, the information exchanger may use a question-tool rather
than a statement-tool. And, like the miner using the hammer-tool, whether or not the information
exchanger uses the tool is of little consequence at an ontological level. It may alter the outcome
of the task at hand, of course, but has no impact on the constitution of the inquirer herself. With
or without the information she desires, the inquirer will simply carry on unchanged and
untouched.
This picture of language, as detached from the language user, as a kind of tool that can be
put to work, and of questioning as one language tool among others, can largely be traced back to
the Aristotelian notion of man as animal rationale, the zoon logon echon [ζῷον λόγοϛ ἔχων]. The
rational animal is a being with the capacity to carry out rationally formulated projects. It is a
being with a definitive ontological constitution. What Heidegger seems to be claiming, however,
is that the act of questioning is not like using a tool but is a unique way of being-in-the-world.
The question is not external to the being of the questioner, something objectively present,
waiting to be used. It is not simply the expressed byproduct of a specific animal with an ability to
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excrete word-signs. It is a form of Dasein’s existential ontological occurrence—i.e a disclosive
condition of possibility. Resisting the temptation to think about questioning in the above terms,
therefore, how might we distinguish its disclosive functioning from Dasein’s other existential
modes?
As he lays out the formal structure of questioning, Heidegger makes two stand out points
that we should now discuss:
(1) “All questioning is a seeking [Suchen].” 46
(2) “[Questioning is] an attitude [Verhalten] adopted by a being, the questioner.”47
Let us elaborate on the nature of these two aspects of questioning. In so doing, we shall enrich
our interpretation of questioning as a temporally situated movement/action, and further expose
the link between Dasein and questioning.
From mundane questions about the weather, to grave questions about the survival odds of
a cancer patient, from shallow questions about dinner plans and neighborhood gossip, to deep
spiritual questions about the meaning of life and the cosmos, all questions seek something. In
such seeking, the seeker projects certain possibilities ahead of herself. She then moves to pursue
those possibilities. In this respect, the English word “questioning” (quest-ioning) has an
advantage over the German “Fragen,” since it carries with it a sense of questing or embarking on
a quest. As a kind of quest, questioning involves movement towards something.
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Heidegger, elaborates on this by arguing that, “questioning is a knowing search
[erkennende Suchen] for beings in their thatness and whatness.”48 In many ways, the goal of any
search is determinative of the path that the search will follow. Thus, by dividing the Erfragtes of
questioning into two forms, Heidegger distinguishes two ways of carrying out the questionposing; i.e. of disclosing and moving through the world. We might wonder, though, why he
makes this distinction. Why divide the seeking of questioning into two? Could he not have
simply said that questioning is a knowing search for beings, and ended it there? What makes
“thatness” distinct from “whatness”?
One way to interpret this division is to see it as a way for Heidegger to distinguish his
questioning from the questioning of the ontic sciences. Heidegger’s questioning concerns the
meaning of being [das sinn von sein]; i.e. the meaning of the that-ness of beings. His focus is on
the fact that beings are at all. The ontic sciences on the other hand are concerned with the whatness or quiddity of beings. Biology, for example, questions beings as biological, chemistry as
chemical, and physics as physical. As such, the questioning of ontic sciences remains within the
confines of their predefined regions of being. The sciences are not concerned with the issue of
being as such and in general. Their existence, in fact, is premised upon an understanding of
“being” that cannot be questioned without stepping outside of the domain itself. Heidegger’s
reason for emphasizing this divide in questioning is, at least in part, that he wants to set his
searching at a distance from such forms of questioning.
Another way to think of this divide is to consider Heidegger’s further claim that, “every
seeking takes its lead beforehand from what is sought.”49 In a rough sense, what Heidegger
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means by this is that questioning is never completely blind. The act of seeking implies a known
goal that guides and directs the search. Of course, every aspect of the goal need not be explicitly
known. It may be that the questioner only has a vague intuition of where her seeking is headed.
Nonetheless, there must be always be a goal to attain and a direction to move towards, or else we
would not know where to take our search, nor where to end it. When searching for lost keys, for
example, the seeker understands what keys are and where they might be. The seeker tries to
recall where they last had the keys. They return to retrace their steps, to examine the places
where the keys may have been left. The same is true of questioning. What is sought, opens up a
possible region in which to pursue the object sought after. In this way, the Erfragtes, as the
leading moment of questioning, is also the moment that discloses and delineates the ground upon
which the search is to be conducted. If, therefore, Heidegger is searching for thatness and not a
whatness, the ground upon which the search is conducted will not be opened up by a “concept”
but by being itself. What this means will be elaborated upon shortly as we discuss the uniqueness
of the Seinsfrage. For now, though, our concern is with questioning in general.
Let us, then, turn to the second defining characteristic of questioning—the “attitude” that
informs its seeking. For Heidegger, questioning is not carried out in a purely disinterested way.
The questioner, in questioning, is not detached from the issue at hand, but is predisposed to it in
some form or another (again, questioning is a mode of Dasein’s being-in-the-world and not the
rational activity of a disinterested subjectivity). We might think of this questioning-attitude as the
mood or disposition that accompanies and informs its questioning-seeking, something like the
style or mood with which the quest is undertaken.
The word Heidegger uses here, “verhalten,” is appropriately translated as “attitude,”
however, this translation does not capture the full and particular sense of the German. In English,
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“attitude” is used to describe general posturing; it is the combination of a state of mind and a
style of behavior or conduct. In this respect, the English and the German are relatively on par.
That said, while there are a wide variety of different attitudes, from joyful to hateful, from lazy to
ambitious, the word “attitude” more often than not carries with it a negative connotation. We
might say that someone is “giving attitude,” or that they “have attitude” when they are posturing
in an abrasive, self-centered, or indolent manner. Moreover, an attitude is something uninhibited
and unchecked. We often tell others that they need to “lose the attitude” which is essentially a
demand that they regain composure.
Verhalten, on the other hand, carries slightly different connotations that are perhaps more
in line with the less common English “forhold” meaning “to withhold, to hold up, to hold back.”
This is because verhalten, used as an adverb, invokes a sense of caution, and of taking care. It
implies deliberation, and self-control. Instead of simply behaving, one behaves. Indeed, when
converted to a noun, taking the form verhaltenheit, the word becomes essentially equivalent to
the English word “restraint.” From this we get a better sense of what Heidegger means when he
tells us that questioning is “an attitude [verhalten] adopted by a being.” For a questioner to pose
a question is, accordingly, for them to take up an attitude of restraint.
We can interpret this to mean that the seeking of questioning is not carried out in haste.
Although the questioner looks to ascertain something, they do not charge ahead in pursuit of it.
Questioning, although futurally directed towards the attainment of some-thing (in terms of a
whatness or thatness), is not entirely predetermined in its projection. In this way, rhetorical
questions and those that come with explicitly preconceived answers are not genuine questions.
While the questioner must have some sort of understanding of that which is sought after, genuine
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questioning is restrained or withheld. This might not seem to be a very radical claim, but in fact
it has broad implications on the kinds of inquiry that we ordinarily find ourselves engaged in.
Here, we might be reminded of the sense of forgetfulness we discussed in the first
section. It was argued that to forget being is to for-get it, that is, to operate under the dis-closure
of a preemptive understanding of being. We might think of questioning as a for-holding in a
similar sense. To for-get the meaning of being is to unhesitatingly presuppose its meaning. From
such a position, forgetful seeking knows what it is looking for. There is no mystery involved, it
simply “gets” what it already had be-fore. To adopt an attitude of for-holding, however, is to
hold back our presuppositions. This can perhaps be understood in two ways. First, to hold the
fore is to try and prevent its unrestrained influence. Second, to hold the fore is to hold it. That is,
to recognize our reliance on the fore and to maintain one’s grasp of it. Instead of reaching out to
grab at a presupposed answer, to “get” it, as one who for-gets does, the questioner holds it. In
this way, the questioner recognizes that her presuppositions play a part in opening the search, but
she does not allow them free reign to direct it. She does not necessarily try to dispose of her
presuppositions, but simply to acknowledge them.
This attitude of for-holding serves to distinguish questioning from other forms of seeking.
Take, for instance, the seeking of a mine worker. Searching for underground minerals, the miner
bores her way through the earth. She knows, in advance, what she is looking for; she knows
where to look for it, what tools are appropriate to the task, and her search is carried out without
restraint. In fact, restraint would only serve to hinder her search and postpone the goal.
Obviously, she must take care to mine safely and in a manner conducive to finding the hidden
minerals, but even when rethinking strategy and contemplating approach, the search moves

45

forward without question. As an experienced miner, her presuppositions are not withheld, but
exploited.50
Before moving ahead, let us recapitulate what we have just discussed. Questioning is
characterized by Heidegger as both a seeking [Suchen] and an attitude [Verhalten]. In its seeking,
questioning ‘takes its lead beforehand from what is sought,’ thus opening up a domain in which
to conduct a search. Seeking disclosively projects ahead of itself. This means that questioning
always already involves a preliminary understanding of what is to be attained in its seeking. The
attitude of questioning, on the other hand, is one of restraint and with-holding. The
understanding by which the projected seeking takes its lead is held-back (although not
dissolved). The attitude of questioning, as restraint, is the manner in which the questioner
approaches the situation at hand and withholds their future projection. This attitude is less
concerned with the future than it is with how things are already going. If seeking is most
intimately linked to the Erfragtes of questioning, then this restrained-attitude is related most
directly to the Gefragtes of questioning’s formal structure; it looks back to the “already” of the
activity. Together, the forward projection of its seeking (for-getting) and the forholding of its
attitude, in their struggle against one another, disclose the world. In questioning, Dasein opens up
a path on which the quest is to be carried out and then follows it.
By laying out these two characteristics of questioning, we are now in a position to
analyze and evaluate it in terms of Dasein’s existence. In order to better understand how

Here, it may be important to discuss Heidegger’s concept of curiosity [Neugier]. Questioning can be
carried out in the same pointed, projective way that the miner carries out her job. Heidegger defines the mood of
such questioning as curiosity. Characterized as a distracted not staying [Unverweilen] and a never dwelling
anywhere, “[curiosity] seeks restlessness and excitement from continual novelty and changing encounters” (Being
and Time, 166). Curious questioning, therefore, moves by way of assumption and projection. It does not rest long
enough to properly open up to the issue at hand. Curiosity does not listen.
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restrained-seeking functions, let us now briefly discuss the shape of Dasein’s existential
structure, as Heidegger describes it Chapter 5: Being-in as Such, and try to map questioning onto
it.51 Recall that for Heidegger, Dasein is the being that is being-in-the-world, always already
conditioned by an understanding of being. The existential structure, as it appears in this chapter,
concerns the shape and configuration that being-in-the-world takes.
First and foremost, Heidegger tells us that, “we see the two equiprimordially constitutive
ways to be the there [to be Dasein] in attunement [Befindlichkeit] and understanding
[Verstehen].”52 Together, he says, attunement and understanding are “determined by discourse
[Rede].”53 Here, again, we have a three-part structure that will, in the unfolding of the text, be
exposed as ecstatically temporal in nature.
In the existential context, understanding [Verstehen] is to be sharply distinguished from
what might be called cognitive understanding or “knowing,” which puts things in order and
breaks them down into constitutive elements. Understanding, as Verstehen, works by projecting
toward a possible future. As Heidegger tells us, “understanding in itself has the existential
structure which we call project [Entwurf].”54 This projection is no mere “looking ahead” and
discovering possibilities that are already there, rather, the understanding first opens the future by
disclosing possibility. In this way, understanding is an active occurrence, and can be
distinguished from a sense of understanding where something is merely “understood”
[Verstanden].
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Understanding, for Heidegger, is fundamentally built into the existential structure of
Dasein and concerns the possibilities of its being, the possibilities that it is. As Heidegger
explains, “understanding is the existential being [Sein] of the ownmost potentiality of being of
Dasein itself in such a way that this being [Sein] discloses in itself what its very being is
about.”55 It is not as if Dasein can look to the future should it so choose, nor is it the case that the
projection of understanding is something willed. As an equiprimordial moment in Dasein’s
existential structure, understanding is always already underway so long as Dasein exists.
Likewise, attunement functions equiprimordially, together with the understanding, to
bring Dasein and its world into being. Unlike the understanding, however, attunement is always
already temporally oriented toward the past. Similar to what would commonly be understood as
a mood or disposition, attunement reveals how the activity (of being-in-the-world) is already
occurring. Its disclosive power, therefore, is acquiescent. As Heidegger explains, “in attunement
lies existentially a disclosive submission to world out of which things that matter to us can be
encountered.”56 It reveals the fact that we are always already thrown into a world, a condition of
our being that Heidegger calls thrownness [Geworfenheit]. Rather than push forward, Dasein
pulls back. As an equiprimordial condition of its being, it is not possible for Dasein to be unattuned. We are never free from an attunement so that we can step into one at will; rather, we are
always already attuned and can only shift from one mode (mood) into another.
Together, the to-be of the understanding and the having-been of attunement function
disclosively in a struggle of forward projection and submissive pull back. That is to say, Dasein’s
being-in-the-world, its appearance into and as the “there” (the “Da” of Dasein), is always already
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shaped by the disclosive struggle of these two existential (temporal) moments. Heidegger
explains that:
As existentials, attunement and understanding characterize the primordial disclosedness
of being-in-the-world. In the mode of ‘being attuned’ Dasein ‘sees’ possibilities in terms
of which it is. In the projective disclosure of such possibilities, it is always already
attuned. The project of its ownmost potentiality of being is delivered over to the fact of
thrownness into the there.57

Emphasis is to be placed on the disclosive function of the attuned-understanding. Beings comes
to be as what they are, meaningfully, in the attuned-understanding, the projecting-having-been of
Dasein’s opening up and standing out into the world.
The third moment of the existential structure, which was alluded to earlier, Heidegger
calls discourse. It, too, functions disclosively alongside the attuned understanding to open up the
world. As Heidegger explains, “discourse is the attuned intelligibility of being-in-the-world.”58
Where understanding is futural in its projection, and attunement is directed towards the past,
discourse is most intimately linked to the present. What is, here and now, is disclosed
discursively. As such, we must not think of discourse simply as the expression of some already
present feelings or ideas; nor should we interpret it in terms of a communicative economy of
already existent information. Rather, discourse is the condition of possibility of there being
anything at all. Together with the attuned-understanding, it reveals the world and ourselves
within it.
If questioning, is a mode of Dasein’s being-in-the-world, then it should also cash out in
terms of discursively expressed attuned-understanding. United as restrained-seeking, questioning
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can easily be mapped onto this existential structure. As a form of discourse, questioning emerges
in and through the struggle between the understanding projection of its seeking, and the attuned
pull back of its restrained attitude; out of this struggle being manifests. Let us continue our
investigation into the way by which the restrained-seeking of questioning differs from other
forms of Dasein’s (discursive) activity with a brief return from the abstract to the concrete.

To Listen and Let Be
For Heidegger, as important as it is to dig into the ontological ground of an issue, it is
also important to be aware of its implications for the ontic every day. Let us, therefore, briefly
reflect on how we might experience the disclosure of this restrained-seeking in our everyday
questioning.
Consider an ordinary conversation between two people wherein one poses a question to
the other. What happens in such a situation (provided the question is not rhetorical) is that the
questioner poses a question and then pauses to listen for a response.59 In this way, the questioner
withholds an answer of their own, and instead waits to receive one from their interlocuter. Even
if the questioner has an idea of what the answer might be, they do not necessarily push their
presumptions onto the interlocuter. Could this “listening” be a part of what Heidegger is trying to
get at with the notion of questioning as restrained-seeking?

Interestingly, the English word “pose” can etymologically be traced back, first to the French “poser”
(meaning to position, to place, to set, to fix), and in turn to the Latin “pausa” (meaning pause, break, or interval). It
might be said, therefore, that an integral aspect of posing is pausing.
59
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In §34, Heidegger offers a discussion of listening and silence “as possibilities belonging
to discoursing speech.”60 If questioning, as we experience it ontically in our everyday lives,
involves the pause of a receptive listening, perhaps this is what distinguishes it from other forms
of discourse. But what, then, is the difference between such receptive, silent listening and less
silent forms of discourse?
Heidegger tells us that discourse “constitutes the disclosedness of being-in-the-world.”61
This, however, does not mean that when we talk about beings we automatically ‘get it right.’
Recall the fact that disclosure is also a dis-closure. This means that the dangers of inauthenticity
are prevalent in the disclosure of existential discourse; as Heidegger tells us, “speaking a lot
about something does not in the least guarantee that understanding is thus furthered. On the
contrary, talking at great length about something covers things over and brings what is
understood into an illusory clarity, that is, the unintelligibility of the trivial.”62 While discourse
opens up the world of beings, it can oftentimes do so in a manner that closes or covers over its
own discursive operations by limiting the possible projections of our understanding. In a sense,
hasty discussion can lead to the closure of being’s more genuine possibilities.
Ostensibly, this means that to combat this for-get-fullness we need silence. For, as
Heidegger explains, “listening constitutes the primary and authentic openness of Dasein.”63 To
be present for the genuine disclosure of beings, Dasein must not engage in idle chatter about it,
but should instead listen. Of course, listening in Heidegger’s sense does not mean simply being
quiet, or not making sound. Silence is not the absence of sound per se, as he explains:
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To keep silent does not mean to be mute. On the contrary, one who is mute still has the
tendency to ‘speak.’ Such a person has not proved that he can keep silent, he even lacks
the possibility of proving this. And the person who is by nature accustom to speak little is
no better able to show that he can be silent and keep silent. […] Authentic silence is
possible only in genuine discourse. In order to be silent, Dasein must have something to
say, that is, must be in command of an authentic and rich disclosedness of itself.64

Heidegger will call this authentically disclosive silence hearkening [Horchen].
If questioning, as the forward forholding of restrained-seeking, is to function in the
manner distinct to it, and not in the manner of an ordinary, unrestrained seeking, it must take the
discursive form of such hearkening. If it fails to do so, it can no longer be considered a genuine
questioning. In the discursive context of an information economy, for example, questions (as
requests for information) do not meet the qualifications of genuine hearkening. For such inquiry
is specific in what it asks for and what it will accept. Its seeking is not held back by an attitude of
forholding but is unrestrained and for-getful. Such “questioning” concerns information and
nothing else besides. It is not open to any other response.
To hearken is to “be in command of an authentic and rich disclosedness.” This does not
mean to “control” or “dominate,” but to let be. And if Dasein is the being that lets beings be, this
“command” is not one of giving direction but of allowing oneself to be oneself, of authentically
disclosing being.65 In German, the above passage reads: “Um schweigen zu können, muß das
Dasein etwas zu sagen haben, das heißt über eine eigentliche und reiche Erschlossenheit seiner
selbst verfügen.”66 There is no mention of any “commanding” in the directive sense, but rather a
being “über” in the sense of “being over” or “being about.” A less misleading translation,
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therefore, might read as: “to be silent, Dasein must have something to say, that is about an
authentic and rich self-disclosure.”
Questioning as a mode of Dasein’s existential occurrence may involve making sound
(indeed, we may utter the words “what does it mean to be?”), yet to avoid the predetermination
of a repetitive, assumptive and hasty answer, the questioner must also open themselves up in a
hearkening that silently listens for an answer and in so doing allows itself and the world to be
disclosed freely and without constraint. In this way, questioning can be understood as an
ontological opening up and letting be, that allows Dasein to be itself, freely.

An Eminent Question(ing)
Before moving into a reflection on the Seinsfrage, let us briefly recap what has been laid
out thus far in terms of a Heideggerian view of questioning in general. Questioning, for
Heidegger, is an active occurrence. It is not an object to be described, but a way of being to be
carried out by a questioner, i.e. Dasein. The occurrence of questioning is tri-unitarily structured
by the Gefragtes, Befragtes, and Erfragtes. Each of these elements are aspects of an act of
question-posing, and are indicative of a temporally structured, mode of being Dasein. This mode
is existentially characterized as a restrained-seeking, a form of attuned-understanding that
functions disclosively by opening an issue and withholding assumption. In questioning, the
questioner listens to that which is at issue, that which emerges. She lets beings be, and in so
doing allows them to speak for themselves without confining them to the terms of an idle chatter
(what Heidegger calls Gerede).
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While the Seinsfrage shares this formal structure of questioning, it is also an especially
unique question. Heidegger describes it as an eminent [ausgezeichnete] question.67 From his
structural interpretation of questioning in general, how might we, in turn, interpret the Seinsfrage
as a unique question?
The first, and perhaps most obviously unique aspect of the Seinsfrage is the concern of its
Gefragtes; namely, the meaning [Sinn] of being. Heidegger defines meaning as, “that wherein
the intelligibility of something maintains itself. That which can be articulated in disclosure that
understands.”68 For something to be meaningful, is for it to be intelligibly disclosed in an
articulatable manner; that is to say, it must come to appearance as the being that it is. The
meaning of the house across the street resides in its appearance as a house.
As Dasein, we are always already immersed in meaning. Our very being is the condition
of possibility of meaning. Recall that, for Heidegger, Dasein is the being that in its being has an
understanding of being [Seinsverständnis]. Our every encounter, therefore, is a meaningful
encounter. For without meaning there is no-thing. Even the mysterious and unknown is disclosed
as the mysterious and unknown. The Seinsfrage, as the question concerning the meaning of
being, is concerned with the disclosure of being as such and in general, and thereby also with
Dasein (as existence).
If questioning about being is always already premised on a provisional understanding of
the meaning of being, no matter how vague and perplexing it might be, then the Seinsfrage is in
some sense circular. We might, therefore, be tempted to say that this circularity is what makes
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the question unique and sets it apart from other questions. Yet, Heidegger is quick to deny the
charge of circular reasoning, writing:
“Circular reasoning” does not occur in the question of the meaning of being. Rather, there
is a notable “relatedness backward or forward” of what is being asked about (being) to
asking as a mode of being of a being. The way what is questioned essentially engages our
questioning belongs to the innermost meaning of the question of being. But this only
means that the being that has the character of Dasein has a relation to the question of
being itself, perhaps even a distinctive one.69

How are we to understand this “relatedness backward or forward” if not in terms of a circular
reasoning? Thinking back to the formal structure of questioning, we might consider this
relatedness in terms of a temporal movement. Recall that there is a unity of relation between
each structural moment of the question-posing [Fragestellung]. As the questioner questions, they
occupy the temporal space of this relation. Engaging the Befragtes, the questioner resides inbetween the Gefrates and the Erfragtes.
Notice also that Heidegger places “circular reasoning” between quotations. He does this
throughout the text to indicate that what he is talking about is to be taken in the ordinary sense.
Indeed, quotations are meant to distinguish the author’s thoughts from an other’s thoughts. In
this case, Heidegger is not quoting another individual’s words but the common sense notion of
the term as it is typically understood (by those he will refer to as the “they”). By placing
quotations around “circular reasoning” Heidegger wants to make clear that he is talking about the
kind of circular reasoning that has been vilified by logicians for centuries and declared
fallacious; the kind of reasoning that is called “begging the question” or petitio principii. When
“begging the question” the conclusion is presupposed in the premises. This is considered faulty
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reasoning because no progress is made. The thinker, rather than move forward towards a new
and novel conclusion, a “truth” that can be added to our bank of knowledge, instead circles
around to what they already knew beforehand.
“Circular reasoning” is considered “bad” because no new information (in the form of a
propositional statement) is gained. In terms of questioning, what we seek to gain is the concern
of the Erfragte or the act of ascertaining. This, of course, is most easily understood as an answer.
Yet, as we discussed in Chapter I, it is unclear that an answer is what Heidegger is ultimately
after. As Dasein, we operate under (and as) an understanding of the meaning of being. We
already have an answer. To question being, therefore, is not necessarily to attempt to ascertain an
answer, in the form of a logical conclusion or a proposition about the meaning of being (i.e. “the
meaning of being is X”). Indeed, “circular reasoning” only occurs within the movement of a
logical argument whereby a thinker moves from premise to premise towards a conclusion.
Heidegger’s denial of “circular reasoning” may, therefore, not be a denial of circularity tout
court, but a denial of the presence of the logical procedure. The Seinsfrage is a question not an
argument.
Any circularity involved is not the circularity of faulty logic (questioning is not arguing),
but a kind of hermeneutic circularity. That said, this hermeneutical circularity is not limited to
the question of being. As a circularity built into the existential structure of Dasein, it is a
condition of all questions. Take, for example, our earlier question: “what is questioning?” This
question, too, falls into an immediate and necessary circle. The question asks after the essence of
questioning, yet, itself is a question. No matter how we address the question of questioning,
therefore, we unavoidably presuppose the nature of what we are addressing. Thus, the
hermeneutic circularity of the Seinsfrage is not a distinguishing feature of the question and
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cannot be considered distinctive. This means that we must look elsewhere for the Seinsfrage’s
uniqueness.
Heidegger provides us with a hint when he says that the Seinsfrage holds priority
[Vorrang] over other questions; specifically, an ontic-ontological priority. 70 How should we
think about this priority? First, it is not to be understood as a prior-ity in any linear sense. It is
clear that the question of being does not (always) come before other questions in any sequential
fashion. Instead, what Heidegger considers the priority of the question is a kind of meaningful
precedence. Indeed, the word used here, “Vorrang,” can also mean precedence or preference.
The priority of the question, therefore, is not related to its position on a timeline, but its position
of importance.
When situated among other questions, the Seinsfrage takes precedence because it is a
question to which all others inevitably defer. The question, “what time is it?”, for example, only
makes sense if we already have a vague understanding of the meaning of the word “time.” Thus,
to fully answer the question “what time is it?” we must first have an answer to the question
“what is time?” Likewise, if we are to answer the question “what is time?” we must first have an
answer for the question “what is is?” If we fail to understand any one of these elements, the
initial question will not make sense. And since, an understanding of being is embedded in
everything that is, the question concerning it (die Seinsfrage) enjoys a level of priority over all
other questions, which without exception refer back to it.
The ontological priority of the Seinsfrage, Heidegger also tells us, is a “scholarly
priority.”71 It has to do with the Seinsfrage’s rank among the questions raised by the sciences. If
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the sciences can be divided up in terms of the questions that they engage with, then the question
of being takes precedence over the entire discourse of science. How so? Discourse functions
disclosively. Each of the sciences open up and operate within their own delineated regions of
being based on their own fundamental concepts. For example, biology raises its questions in the
region of biological-beings, chemistry in the region of chemical-beings, physics operates in the
region of physical-beings, etc. These regions can be hierarchically construed in terms of the
fundamentality of their basic concepts as they relate to the other sciences. While there is great
debate among scientists today as to how we ought to organize this hierarchy,72 for Heidegger, the
referential priority of the Seinsfrage means that every science has its foundation in the
metaphysical discourse known as ontology.
Ontology is typically defined as the philosophical study of being—i.e. it is a questioning
concerning being. Indeed, the word “ontological” is comprised of the Greek “ón” [ὤν] and
“logos” [λόγος]. The former refers to being, the latter to discourse, speech, or reasoning. Just
what questioning-being entails, however, has differed greatly throughout the history of the
discipline. And so, although ontology is the most fundamental science, there is no single
ontology on which to ground the rest of the sciences. Instead, there is a plethora of ontologies
offered by a number of different thinkers. Plotinus, for example, offers a monist ontology, while
thinkers like Anaxagoras offer what can be called a pluralistic ontology.73 What is more, the
discipline itself is not only concerned solely with the question of being, but is fragmented into a
number of different questions. These include questions about the nature of reality and actuality,
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the existence of God, and the nature of time. St. Anselm’s famous ontological argument, for
example, is his answer to the question “does God exist?”74
What we should take note of, however, is the fact that all of these questions meaningfully
defer to the more basic ontological question, the question of being. Asking what reality is, what
actuality is, what time is, or whether God is, necessarily involves the question of what is means.
This is not to say that the ontologist asking these questions has posed and answered the question
of being in advance, but that all of these questions are grounded in an answer to the Seinsfrage. If
we want to fully address these questions, we must inevitably also address the question of being.
And so, even the fundamental discourse of ontology is bound up with the question of being. For
Heidegger, “all ontology, no matter how rich and tightly knit a system of categories it has at its
disposal, remains fundamentally blind and perverts its innermost intent if it has not previously
clarified the meaning of being sufficiently and grasped this clarification as its fundamental
task.”75 In this way, the Seinsfrage maintains ultimate priority (in the sciences) in terms of scope.
It is not only a question raised in the most fundamental of all sciences, ontology, but is the most
fundamental question of that science.
So, what does this “scholarly priority” mean for those who would pose the question of
being? Why does priority matter? After briefly raising the issue of what purpose this question
should serve, Heidegger hints toward the creative possibility of the Seinsfrage. He tells us that,
“true progress [of the sciences] comes about not so much in collecting results and storing them in
‘handbooks’ as in being forced to ask questions about the basic constitution of each domain.”76
This means that questioning concerning foundations is tantamount to scientific progress and
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development. And, since the question of being is concerned with the foundation of, not only one,
but all domains of science, one can only assume that “working out” the Seinsfrage is an activity
with the capacity to progressively develop the scientific endeavor in its entirety. How exactly
questioning does this, and what is meant by “true progress” is left unexplained. All Heidegger
says is that it, “takes place in the revision of [the sciences’] basic concepts.”77 Presumably, then,
the various concepts of being that ground the sciences’ are “revised” in and through questioning.
And since these concepts open and delineate the region in which each science operates, such
revision is prompts an overhaul of the entire discourse from the “ground” up.
In addition to its ontological priority, Heidegger tells us that the Seinsfrage enjoys an
ontic priority as well, suggesting that its influence stretches beyond the realm of the sciences.
The word “ontic” is derived from the same Greek root as ontological [ón], but without the
addition of “logos.” The ontic realm is, therefore, not limited to the same conceptual constraints
as the specific scientific discourses. For something to be ontic means that it pertains to beings
generally. Indeed, anywhere beings manifest and are asked about, the Seinsfrage has relevance.
For Heidegger, this means that the ontic realm is essentially coextensive with the existence of
Dasein. In this way, the ontic priority of the Seinsfrage concerns its status among questions in
general. The Seinsfrage’s ontic priority, therefore, precedes and supersedes its ontological
priority in terms of scope. And, if the ontological priority of the Seinsfrage signals to its capacity
to inspire “true progress” of the sciences, its ontic priority signals to its capacity to develop the
entire world of being.
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Yet, while scholarly questions are ultimately grounded in particular conceptions of being
(as biological, physical, chemical), ontic questions are not grounded in the same way. The ontic
realm is not delineated by particular concepts concerned with the whatness of beings but is the
realm of being delineated by being’s self disclosure in terms of the understanding of being
[Seinsverständnis] that characterizes Dasein’s existential situation. This understanding does not
necessitate clear cut definition and definitive conceptualization but is largely intuitive and
mysterious. Indeed, the understanding of being grounding the ontic realm is not a concept at all
but a thatness. Heidegger makes this clear right away when listing three common misjudgments
about being (what he calls prejudices [Vorurteile]). He tells us that:
The ‘universality’ of ‘being’ is not that of genus. ‘Being’ does not delimit the highest
region of beings so far as they are conceptually articulated according to genus and
species: ουτε το ον γενυς [‘being is not a genus’]. The ‘universality’ of being ‘surpasses’
the universality of genus.78

Being is not a whatness, not a universal category, but a thatness. Can such a thatness be revised
in the same way a scientific concept can? At this point, we cannot say. Perhaps as we move
forward the issue will become clearer.

An Open-Ending
Along with its ontic-ontological priority, the Seinsfrage can also be distinguished from
other questions by its unique formulation. Question-posing [Fragestellung] in general involves
three unified structural movements. The question of being is no exception. Mapping this
temporal structure onto the Seinsfrage, however, we find that we are missing an element. The
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Gefragtes, as the asking-about, concerns the meaning of being. The Befragtes, as the
interrogating, concerns Dasein. It is unclear though what the Erfragtes, as the ascertaining, is
concerned with. What does the Seinsfrage seek?
The obvious answer is that it seeks the meaning of being. Yet, the meaning of being is
that which concerns the Gefragtes of the Seinsfrage. Is it possible that it could also be the
concern of the Erfragtes? If so, how? Considering an understanding of being always already
informs our being, are we just searching for what we already have? Is the question of being just
about clarifying our foggy intuition? Considering also the ontological difference, it would seem
that no amount of clarification could ever bring our intuitive understanding of being (in terms of
a thatness) completely into open as an explicit claim about being (in terms of a whatness). Such a
quest would certainly be futile. Heidegger does, however, suggest that question has the power to
inspire “true progress” through the revision of founding concepts. Could it be that the Seinsfrage
aims to “revise” the thatness with which the Gefragtes is concerned, so that its Erfragtes is a new
understanding of being? If so, this new understanding would ostensibly be under the same
constraints as the old and could not be expressed as an explicit and direct statement about being.
So, the question remains, what is the Seinsfrage after?
In Chapter I, we argued that the assumption that the Seinsfrage is a pointed striving for an
answer must be cast into doubt on the basis of our forgetful condition. Nonetheless, we did not
say definitively that the Seinsfrage does not seek answers. Instead, we chose to withhold our
assumptions about what questioning entails to allow the essence of (Heideggerian) questioning to
reveal itself. What we did say was that the Seinsfrage is always already being-out-from-answer.
Rather than deny that questions seek answers, we bracketed the assumption, not permitting our
own prejudices to obscure what Heidegger is trying to do. Thus, it was discovered that the
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seeking of questioning is a restrained-seeking, a temporal action marked by a specific form of
listening, what Heidegger calls hearkening [horen]. This seeking differs from other forms of
seeking in that it does not hastily and without resistance project predetermined conclusions onto
the landscape of the search. The restrained-seeking of such questioning withholds its own
influence. Whatever is sought after, therefore, is not to be (for)gotten, but (for)given. And so,
even if Heidegger is seeking an answer, the search will not be conducted in a pointed manner,
nor will any possible answer come in the form of an expressed statement. He will open up and
hearken for one. Practicing restrained-seeking, Heidegger prepares to receive.
What is ultimately unique and special about the Seinsfrage, therefore, and what sets it
apart from other questions, is that it has no explicitly defined goal. It is a pure openness at the
most fundamental level of existence. It does not function under the guidance of any universal
concept. Instead, it serves the thatness of being itself; i.e. the vague, mysterious emergence of
beings, that nevertheless implicitly conditions the disclosure of the world. The questioner does
not seek a particular answer (given as a whatness), but hearkening to being, readies themselves
to receive one. Rather than idlily circle around in a predefined understanding of being, the
questioner strives to withhold their assumptions, to let beings be. She prepares to receive an
answer by allowing being to express itself through her Dasein on its own terms. And, if
everything we think and do is carried out under the guidance of an implicit answer to being, to
receive a new answer would be to radically transform the beings that we are and the world that
we live in.
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Recollection
The aim of Being and Time is to work the Seinsfrage out from the oblivion of
forgetfulness. In order to understand what this entails, it was crucial to give an account of the
Seinsfrage as a unique question. Following Heidegger’s claim that we have forgotten the
question, it was decided that we must begin with an textually internal reflection on questioning
more generally. Examining Heidegger’s account of the “formal structure” of question-posing
[Fragestellung], it was argued that questioning can be understood as a tri-unitary temporal
activity and engagement with beings. As such, questioning can be seen as a mode of Dasein. If
this is the case, then in order to manifest a question-posing we must be transported into it (and as
it). Paying careful attention to the language Heidegger employs, as well as to his off-hand
remarks about questioning, it was argued that questioning is characterized by restrained-seeking
as the specific mode of Dasein’s attuned-understanding. This mode we called “openness to the
issue at hand,” can be interpreted as a kind of meditative listening, a hearkening, wherein Dasein,
as questioner, withholds its necessary presumptions in order to remain authentically silent. It is
not to deny our assumptions, but to hold onto them in a way that resists their unfettered
influence. It is to check our expectations, to withhold ourselves, to exercise restraint, rather than
address the issue with haste. In this way, questioning is a preparing to receive.
Ultimately, this suggested that the Seinsfrage can be interpreted as a particular
manifestation of this mode wherein the questioner is opened to the issue of being. We can
interpret Heidegger’s task, therefore, not as an attempt to define and describe the Seinsfrage, but
as an attempt to exemplify and embody it. To work out the question of the meaning of being, that
is to manifest or bring out the question, is to become open to the issue (issuing) of being. What is
more, since Dasein is the being that is ontically distinguished by its relation to being, the
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Seinsfrage can be interpreted as a possibility unique to Dasein. As Heidegger puts it, “the
question of being is nothing else than the radicalization of an essential tendency of being that
belongs to Dasein itself.”79 This, however, tells us very little about what is at stake in raising (i.e.
becoming) the Seinsfrage.
In response to this concern, it was shown that Heidegger suggests questioning has the
capacity to effect discursive/disclosive development. Heidegger argues that the progressive
development of the sciences comes about in and through a questioning that concerns their
fundamental concepts. The ontological priority of the Seinsfrage indicates that such questioning
has the potential to effect broad scholarly development. The ontic-priority of the Seinsfrage,
further suggested that this potential reaches beyond even the sciences towards our everyday lives
as Dasein, as beings in-the-world. In questioning, by opening ourselves to the issue (issuing) of
being, we prepare ourselves for a radical transformation of the very possibilities that we are.
At this point, we might wonder how exactly we are to go about manifesting the
Seinsfrage? Is this something we can attain through proper exertion of the will, or, perhaps,
through a lack of willful exertion? Is opening up to the issue of being as easy as holding our
tongue? Earlier, it was suggested that the work [Arbeit] involved in working out [Ausarbeitung]
the Seinsfrage is not the work of a one-time job, but a lifelong labour—a kind of vocation or
calling. It is not the kind of work that actualizes a desired possibility but is the work that sustains
our livelihood. To work out the Seinsfrage, therefore, is no easy task. In order to gain a deeper
understanding of this task, the last section of this thesis will be dedicated to the question
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concerning how Heidegger attempts to work out the question of the meaning of being in Being
and Time.
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Chapter III: Toward the Seinsfrage

In the previous chapter I outlined a Heideggerian interpretation of questioning and of
questioning-being. I concluded that to question being is to existentially open oneself up to the
possibility of a radical transformation at an ontological level. Such a transformation is not the
result of a properly directed will, nor is it the product of some imaginative faculty, but is
something given. In questioning we prepare to receive and be received, the rest is out of our
hands. The questioner, rather than inject novelty into an already existent world, is readied to be
thrown into a new one. With this in mind, we are now prepared to return to the first chapter
wherein I argued that Being and Time is Heidegger’s attempt to bring the Seinsfrage out from the
oblivion of forgetfulness. Ostensibly, then, the work itself is Heidegger’s attempt to manifest a
readied openness to being. Thus, the existential analysis of Dasein, which comprises the majority
of the published text, ought to be read as the means by which the question is to be posed. The
task now is to reflect on how such an analysis might accomplish this goal. The leading question
of this chapter will therefore be: how does an analysis of Dasein contribute to the work of
manifesting the Seinsfrage?
If questioning is a mode of Dasein’s being, and questioning-being an eminent form of
this mode, then the structures that constitute Dasein’s fundamental existence will play a key role
in terms of conditioning and allowing such questioning. The nature of this role and the status of
such structures, however, remain vague and unclear. As I meditate on this question, I shall
engage in something of an Auseinandersetzung with what might be called the “transcendental
interpretation” of Being and Time championed by Jeff Malpas and John Caputo.
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The transcendental interpretation views Heidegger’s project as an essentially Kantian
one, albeit stripped of its Cartesian baggage. Its fundamental claim is that the existential analysis
is an attempt to discover and map out the absolute a priori of existence in order to (a) lay the
groundwork for an authentic ontology, one that overcomes the problems of historical ontology,
and/or (b) provide stable ground from which to launch a critique of the tradition. The idea being
that Being and Time is largely driven by traditional philosophic ambitions (i.e. “knowing” the
nature of reality). For the transcendentalists, Heidegger’s attempt to expose the existential
structure of Dasein is an attempt to uncover the conditions of any and all possibility, to discover
that by which being occurs, wherever and whenever it does so.
I shall argue that, although fair in many respects, the transcendental account ultimately
underestimates the creative radicality of Heidegger’s project. Approaching the text under the
mistaken presupposition that questions are always being-toward-answer, and that Heidegger’s
aim is to “answer” the Seinsfrage, the proponents of a transcendental Heidegger mistake the
provisional and preliminary character of his claims for definitive conclusions. This assumption
ultimately leads to a misconstrued view of Dasein’s existential structure as a universal and
unchangeable framework. Considering Heidegger’s reversal of the question-answer dynamic,
wherein an answer always already precedes and guides the question, we can begin to recast the
existential analysis in terms of the task of manifesting the Seinsfrage, rather than responding to
it. This will prove to have serious, although subtle, consequences on how we understand the
transcendental status of the analytic.
The existential analysis of Dasein is Heidegger’s attempt to reawaken [zu wecken] the
Seinsfrage. This means that the journey of reawakening, of moving out from the oblivion of
forgetfulness and into the openness of an awakened questioning, is to be carried out analytically.
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That said, how an analysis of existence can accomplish this task remains to be decided. A
decision for which we must first consider what it means to analyze existence at all. I, therefore,
ask: what is the existential analytic? And in so doing, I also ask the more fundamental questions:
what is existence? what is analysis?
Before we begin, however, it should be noted that Heidegger presents the task of working
out the Seinsfrage as a “two-fold task,” one that is both analytical and destructive. He aims to
give an analysis of the existential structures of Dasein, and to loosen the distorting influence of
tradition and its concealments by “[staking] out its limits.”80 Ostensibly, the second part of this
two-fold task was to be undertaken in the unpublished second half. There, Heidegger was to give
a critical reverse reading of three canonical figures of western philosophy (Kant, Descartes and
Aristotle), not by disputing their work, but by demonstrating how the question of being
necessarily remained closed off to and by their work. Presumably, then, the existential analysis
only represents part of Heidegger’s wider task, and not its absolute accomplishment.81 Without
speculating on the reasons why Heidegger chose not to continue with publication of the second
half of Being and Time, it is important to acknowledge the preparatory character of the
published text. I shall consider this aspect of the analytic in further detail later. For now, let us
ruminate on the above questions concerning existence and analysis.
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An Analytical Awakening
What is Existence?
The existential analysis, as its name suggests, is an analysis of existence. Recall that, for
Heidegger, existence [Existenz] is a term strictly reserved for the human being as Dasein. It
refers to the disclosive occurrence of Dasein’s opening up and standing out into a world. The
analysis, therefore, is a kind of self-examination. This examination, however, does not concern
itself with the various accidental aspects of human existence, instead it focuses on what makes us
unique—i.e. our understanding relationship to being. That said, it should not be confused with a
purely taxonomic exercise in categorizing human being by setting it apart from other beings. For
what makes Dasein unique, its existence, according to Heidegger, is also what disqualifies it
from being considered one being among others in a totality of beings. For Dasein is not any one
actualized possibility but is the condition of our varied possibilities of being. Thus, Heidegger
limits the existential analysis to an explication of Dasein’s capacity as a conditioning
potentiality.
To emphasize this focus, Heidegger introduces a distinction between what he calls the
existential and the existentiell; i.e. between that which is directly related to the process of
clearing and that which is incidental to it, respectfully.82 As he explains, “all explications arising
from an analytic of Dasein are gained with a view toward its structure of existence. Because
these explications are defined in terms of existentiality, we shall call the characteristics of being
of Dasein existentials.”83 The existential analysis is not concerned with the ontic, existentiell
aspects of Dasein’s occurrence but is solely focused on its conditioning relation to being’s
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disclosure. The aim is to uncover what is most fundamental to our thatness (as opposed to our
whatness).
Now, it is important to remember that, for Heidegger, existence is not a stable, substantial
“thing.” It is not and object, nor is it objective in a way that lends itself to straight forward
description. Rather, it is a dynamically unfolding movement—an occurrence. Exploiting its
etymological connection to the Greek ekstasis [ἔκστασις], Heidegger insists that existence is
fundamentally disclosive. To exist is to stand-out into the world wherein beings (itself included)
first come to be as they are. Dasein, as existing, is the condition of possibility of being’s
disclosure via beings. As such, Heidegger will sometimes describe Dasein as a kind of opening
up or clearing [Lichtung]. When attempting to interpret this description, however, we must be
careful not to think of it as a static opening, some kind of neutral, objectively present enclosure,
for it is the active, continual process of an ecstatic opening and disclosing of being (emphasis on
the “-ing”). It is not a one-time happening, an act of creation that once accomplished is over and
done with. As long as it exists, Dasein is always under way. It is never finished opening so that it
may stand still, complete and entirely open.
This dynamism will prove to have important consequences on the nature of the analysis
that is to be carried out. For, unlike an objectively present being, which can be objectively and
disinterestedly described and broken down into distinctive parts, the being that we are (Dasein)
cannot be so easily captured. Existence cannot be reduced to a set of accidental properties or
categories.
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What is more, if the goal is to expose what is fundamental to existence as such,
Heidegger cannot limit his analysis to a single mode.84 To expose what is fundamental to
existence, as the condition of possibility of being, requires careful consideration of our varied
ways of being. This is not just a matter of widening the field of vision, but of allowing the
position from which, and the means by which, the analysis is carried out to also become
dynamic. Because the analysis has a reflexive character (we ourselves are the beings under
investigation), it could not be fully carried out from the position of disinterested observation. To
approach existence in this way alone is to confine its self-analysis to one specific mode, one
possibility of being. It is to narrow an otherwise wholistic investigation. In order to expose what
is fundamental to Dasein’s occurrence in its myriad forms, Heidegger’s analysis remains open to
the average, the everyday, and the otherwise mundane modes of existence often ignored by the
sciences.
Heidegger is careful to emphasize, however, that while the investigation is opened to the
average every day, it is no less concrete than other forms of scientific analysis. As he explains,
The explication of Dasein in its average everydayness, however, does not just
give average structures in the sense of a vague indeterminacy. What is ontically in
the way of being average can very well be understood ontologically in terms of
pregnant structures [prägnanten Strukturen] which are not structurally different
from the ontological determinations of an authentic being of Dasein.85

Among the varying modes of Dasein’s existence there are more and less authentic modes. Heidegger will
spend a great deal of time demonstrating that the authentic mode of Dasein’s being is anticipatory-resoluteness. He
does this in order to discover the possible being-a-whole of Dasein, wherein the fundamental structure of Dasein’s
existence is fully disclosed. In no way does the discovery of anticipatory-resoluteness as Dasein’s authentic mode of
existence represent the conclusion of the analysis nor the posing of the Seinsfrage. It is a path-mark not a
destination.
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The existential analysis, open to all forms of Dasein’s occurrence, is on the lookout for the
“pregnant structures” [prägnanten Strukturen] that constitute the existential aspects of Dasein’s
disclosive capacity. In simpler terms, the existential analysis is concerned with exposing and
explicating the structural characteristics of Dasein that make it what it is (or rather, that it is).
The question we as interpreters of this task now face, is how we are to evaluate Heidegger’s
efforts to uncover these pregnant structures. How will we know when he has found them? Where
do they reside? Do they precede the manifestation of being, in order to give rise to it? Or, are
they somehow coextensive with it? Do they have a kind of independent, autonomous, and
sovereign presence? Or, are they necessarily embedded in and tied up with being’s disclosure?
Can these structure’s change? Or, are they necessarily unchanging? If so, what would it mean to
pin them down to a single form?
There are those that interpret the existential structure of Dasein as a consistent structure,
one that is stable and unchanging. The transcendentalist interpretation of Being and Time sees
the existential analysis as an attempt to expose the fundamental, unwavering conditions of any
and all possibility. As Jeff Malpas argues, “[Heidegger is] centrally concerned to understand
place as the Da of Being, so the place he seeks to understand is not any particular place but
rather the place that makes every such place possible.”86 For Malpas, the structures that give
shape to and inform Dasein’s being (as the place of all possible places) comprise the
fundamental foundation underlying all possibility. These structures run through every being and
way of being—they are the highest laws of being’s disclosure.
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John Caputo similarly characterizes Being and Time as “a transcendental account of the
conditions of possibility of the meaning of being, that is, of how one ‘meaning’ of being after
another comes about.”87 For Caputo, this means that existence is not subject to historical change
and development but is the static condition of the possibility of history and the development of
meaning. Whether in ancient Mesopotamia or some distant and unimaginable future, all
historically meaningful possibilities are conditioned (made possible) by the same structures of
Dasein. For Caputo, “what Heidegger means by the ‘meaning’ of being cannot have historical
instantiation, because it is a transcendental theory about the history of metaphysics, not a theory
which assumes a place within that history.”88
The existential structure of Dasein, therefore, is taken by the transcendentalist to be an ahistorical, a priori condition of all possibility of being; it “transcends” all ontic/existentiell
possibilities in the manner of a surpassing that maintains an essential priority over them. Once
Heidegger reaches the end of the analytic, having exposed and mapped out the existential
structure, the issue can be considered definitively settled.
In this way, the transcendentalist interprets the project of Being and Time as a descendant
of Immanuel Kant’s critical project. Like Heidegger, Kant engages with the question concerning
human being and its relationship to the advent of phenomenal beings. He is interested in
mapping out the universal a priori conditions of possibility, which he locates in a transcendental
subjectivity. Kant’s reason for doing so is to provide the sciences with a stable foundation. Just
as the wise man builds his house on rock rather than on sand, he plans to build a future
metaphysics, one that will overcome the problems plaguing the metaphysics of his day. This fact
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is reflected in the preface to the first edition of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, which introduces
the text as preparatory to an upcoming (but never completed) work entitled Metaphysic of
Nature.89
For the transcendentalist, Heidegger’s project is Kantian in spirit and ambition, and only
really differs from his predecessor in scope. Where Kant is concerned with transcendental
structures of subjectivity, Heidegger is concerned with the transcendental structures of
existence—that is, of being itself. This means that the phenomenal/noumenal split in Kant is
dissolved in Heidegger. Where Kant focuses on the phenomenal realm of being, resigning the
noumenal realm to the unspeakable and unspoken, Heidegger does not divide being in this way
all. Indeed, Heidegger makes clear that the goal of analytic is to, “[expose] the horizon for an
interpretation of the meaning of being in general.”90 And, since all human activity (including
metaphysics), for Heidegger, takes place under the guidance of a preliminary understanding of
being, this horizon is both fundamental and all-encompassing. He thereby positions his efforts
prior to the Kantian project in terms of logical precedence. As he explains:
It was intimated in the introduction that a task is furthered in the existential analytic of
Dasein, a task whose urgency is hardly less than that of the question of being itself: the
exposition of the a priori which must be visible if the question ‘what is human being?’ is
to be discussed philosophically.91
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At first glance the transcendentalist interpretation seems to be a reasonable reading of the
project. We ought to be reminded, however, (and never lose sight of the fact) that Heidegger’s
task is to reawaken the Seinsfrage and bring it out from the oblivion of forgetfulness. A key
difference between the Kantian project and the Heideggerian one is that, while Kant sought to
answer a question (“what is man?”), Heidegger looks only to pose one. Contextualizing the
existential analysis in this way, and putting it into the service of questioning, changes the nature
of the a priori project in ways we will soon discover.
Under the assumption that the question has already been posed and that an answer is
being sought, an assumption informing both Malpas’ and Caputo’s accounts, the existential
analytic certainly appears to be a task with definitive ambitions. For Malpas, “the question of
being is not a question of how things, already understood as present to us, are constituted as the
beings that they are, but, prior to this, it asks how it is that any being can even come to be
present.”92 Ultimately, this means that, “the question of being is indeed underlain by a ‘more
radical question’—namely, the question of place.”93 For Malpas, the existential analysis seeks to
answer this more radical question in the form of Dasein’s unchanging existential structure, thus
establishing the ground of all metaphysics. For Caputo, on the other hand, Being and Time has
destructive ambitions. “The quest for the meaning of Being,” he argues, “is a deconstructive one
which dismantles historical theories in order to find out what makes them work [my italics].”94 In
this way, Caputo frames the existential analysis as an attempt to establish a stable foundation
from which to critically examine the history of metaphysics. The exposure of an unchanging,
transcendental horizon would be instrumental to both the construction of an account of the origin
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of being that authentically rests upon and is at home within this horizon, as well as a destructive
effort to deconstruct the history of ontology. Without this kind of stability philosophy would, to
quote Kant, become an “arena of endless contests.”95
If, however, we are right to say that the question has not yet been posed, and that the
analysis of existence serves only to accomplish this posing (not answering), then the status of the
existential horizon need not be so definitively set. For questions, unlike answers, do not need a
stable ground to uphold their dignity and status. In fact, questioning as Heidegger understands it
fundamentally resists the determination of a single unchanging answer.96 While it certainly
emerges out from and under the guidance of an understanding of the meaning of being, this
understanding need not be a-historical and unchanging. Questions are temporal, dynamic, in
some sense organic, and do not need to be rooted in concrete. Thus, by emphasizing that
existence is the condition of possibility of questioning, we can begin to cast doubt on the
necessity of considering it in such definitive “transcendental” terms.97
To be sure, Heidegger does say that “being and its structure transcend every being and
every possible existent determination of a being. Being is the transcendens pure and simple.”98
Nonetheless, he qualifies this statement in a footnote saying that this is not to be understood in
the manner of a Greek-Platonic or scholastic transcendens (“despite every metaphysical
resonance”), but as an ecstatic transcendens.99 For Plato and the scholastics, to be transcendental
is to occupy a place beyond the limits of the phenomenal, the physical and the experiential (the
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place of all place, to use Malpas’ turn of phrase). What Heidegger seems to indicate here, by
claiming that the structure of being is ecstatically transcendent, is that it does not reside in some
other worldly realm above and beyond the manifestation of beings (i.e. the realm of Platonic
Ideas) but is co-extensive with their manifestation. This means that the structure informing the
disclosure of beings cannot be separated from the beings themselves. The two arise together as
one. Here again we ought to recall Heidegger’s effort to etymologically link the German Existenz
and the Greek ekstasis [ἔκστασις]. For Heidegger, the disclosure of existence is ecstatic in the
sense that it does not occur on the basis of some other ground, one that is stable, unchanging, a
priori and distinct from that which is disclosed. Rather, Dasein ecstatically opens on its own
terms in its myriad forms; it arises from no-thing, springs into existence and is self-structured.
The ecstatic nature of existence means that it manifests itself. In this way, Heidegger detaches
existence from any notion of ultimate ground.
Now, the transcendental nature of Dasein’s ecstatic existence means that its existential
structure is not limited to any one particular disclosure. Being and its structure “transcend every
being and every possible existent determination of a being.” What, though, does Heidegger mean
by ‘possible existent determination’? The transcendentalist Heideggerian takes this to mean that
the existential structure transcends any and all possible disclosures of being. This, however, is a
somewhat hasty conclusion of which I am skeptical. The crux of my skepticism revolves around
the interpretation of the phrase ‘possible existent.’ Does Heidegger, as the transcendentalist
contend, use the word ‘possible’ to mean anytime and anywhere, in any world or epoch that
being manifests and is existent? Or, does he mean the possibility that is open to us right now, at
this time, as a current possibility? Is the emphasis on ‘possible’ or ‘existent’? Let us not decide
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upon this just yet, and instead allow this question to ruminate in the background as we move
toward the next question:
What is Analysis?
Moving forward, we should now consider more closely what it means to analyze
existence. Commonly understood, analysis is a way of formally describing something, be it an
objective entity or a state of affairs. Analysis is often carried out under the pretense of a task of
understanding and evaluating the object’s (or state’s) constitution and general function; parsing it
apart, breaking it down into its constitutive elements, and conceptually organizing them in order
to further some wider task or problem-solving effort. An analyst typically begins with an initial
impression of the object or state and then slowly works her way down to what is most
fundamental to it, or else strives to isolate and root out problematic elements in it. This
characterization is true of nearly all forms of analysis including budget analysis, computer
system analysis, semantic analysis, etc. And in many ways, Heidegger’s existential analytic
follows this formula as well. It is, after all, an attempt to examine Dasein in order to expose and
isolate the most basic structure of its existence. We may wonder, though, how this examination is
to take place. How should we break down our own experience in order to discover the existential
structure informing it? How do we know what constitutes an existential (verses an existentiell)
aspect of our being? How does Heidegger distinguish the fundamental from the incidental?
First, it should be noted that the entity under investigation (Dasein) necessarily sets the
existential analysis apart from other analytical tasks in two ways. To analyze Dasein is different:
(1) for one, because Dasein is not an actualized “object” but a condition of possibility, and (2) for
two, because the analyst is never a disinterested subject able to coldly and unbiasedly observe
herself from an impartial position. As we briefly mentioned earlier, the existential analysis is a
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reflexive procedure of self-examination and self-understanding. The examiner and the examined
are one and the same. We cannot step back from ourselves as we can when analyzing other
entities. What is more, Dasein, as being-in-the-world, is always already embedded in a world.
Our encounters with ourselves always already take place in a meaningful context. The notion of
a disinterested ground, for Heidegger, is an illusion.
Now, we might think that the immediate unity of the two aspects of analytic activity
(examiner and examined) is enough to guarantee a direct line to the structure that is sought after.
Unfortunately, Dasein’s being-in-the-world, as a dis-closive occurrence, hinders the possibility
of immediate clarity regarding ourselves. For not only do we open onto a world, we open into
that world as well. As Heidegger explains, “initially and for the most part, Dasein is taken over
[benommen] by its world.”100 To be “taken over” in this way is to always find ourselves in a
position of self-understanding, wherein we have already been disclosed to ourselves. Depending
on the nature of this disclosure, however, we can be closed off from a more authentic selfunderstanding capable of encountering what is fundamental to our own existence. The disclosure
of existentials is conditioned upon the disclosive power of Dasein via those existentials. If,
therefore, the world Dasein finds itself in is unconducive to the occurrence of an authentic
existence, then the task of an existential analysis can be severely impeded. In order for the
existentials to be discovered, therefore, the analysis requires that we adopt an appropriate
bearing.
From the oblivion of forgetfulness, such a task is undoubtedly difficult. This does not
mean that it is impossible, but that the existential analytic must function on the premise that it
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could be, and likely is, operating under the influence of an inauthentic disclosure. What do we do
when we cannot trust any of our possible ways of being? Despite this untrustworthiness,
however, no matter which form our self-understanding takes, the existential structure informing
it (as an ecstatic-transcendental structure) should be embedded in it. No disclosure is ever a
complete closure. Despite its challenges, therefore, the task is never beyond reach.
In order to expose the existential structure of Dasein, we must strive to resist the closure
of Dasein’s self-disclosure. The question is, how might we do this? For one, the existential
analysis of Dasein must avoid the interpretive assumptions built into the various scientific
disciplines (physics, biology, chemistry, anthropology, psychology, etc…). Not only that, the
existential analysis must resist all assumption about the human being, be it religious, secular,
economic, or professional. This is undoubtedly an arduous task. For Heidegger, we tend to
understand ourselves in ways offered up by the world we live in; a world that none of us chose to
be born into, and a context that none of us chose to be a part of.101 We simply find ourselves
here, always already adopting and taking on the roles made available to us. Recall, Heidegger’s
use of the term thrownness [Geworfenheit] to capture the involuntary aspect of our always
already being-in-the-world. To be sure, however, this is not a case of mistaken identity. As
Heidegger writes [italics added]:
Dasein is my own, to be always in this or that way. It has somehow always already
decided in which way Dasein is always my own. The being which is concerned in its
being about its being is related to its being as its ownmost possibility. Dasein is always
its possibility. It does not “have” that possibility only as a mere attribute of something
objectively present.102
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We, at any given time, are the possibilities we take up, and nothing else besides. The problem,
however, is that the possibilities of being that we currently take on have the propensity of
covering over the existential aspect of our being.103 And, in the context of the existential analytic,
this is detrimental to a proper and full examination of our being.
The analytic must resist the influence of our ordinary self-understanding, while at the
same time exploiting it—a fine line, indeed. Heidegger recognizes that we cannot escape the
closure of dis-closure, that we can never encounter the structures of our existence in a bare way,
free from all contextualized and assumptive influence. In recognizing this fact, however, he does
not imply that the analysis is doomed from the start. The point is not that it cannot be done, but
that there are certain constraints on the kind of outcome we can expect and method we must use
when attempting the task. The existential analysis is not something that can be carried out
naively or without restraint. The question we must ask, therefore, is: considering these
constraints, how is the analysis of Dasein to be carried out?

Letting (the Hidden) be Seen
Heidegger argues that “the point of departure of the analysis, the access to the
phenomenon, and passage through the prevalent coverings must secure their own method.”104 By
this, he means to say that the methods of analysis must be appropriate to the subject matter under
investigation, that the being to be analyzed must be free to guide its own analysis; rather than
forced to take on predetermined form or rigid methodological structure. The existential analysis,
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therefore, must function on Dasein’s terms. And, as we have already noted, Dasein is not a
objectifiable entity. It is, rather, a dynamic, flexible, and hermeneutically circular opening—a
being that always already exists prior to the analysis, informing and shaping it. The method of
procedure, therefore, must also be dynamic, flexible and attuned to hermeneutic circularity.
For Heidegger, this means adopting a phenomenological approach. Of course, what
phenomenology means for him is somewhat unique. We shall, therefore, briefly explains what he
entails by the term. Firstly, Heidegger tells us that, “the expression ‘phenomenology’ signifies
primarily a concept of method. It does not characterize the what of philosophical research in
terms of their content, but the how of such research.”105 Unlike other -ologies, the term
phenomenology does not delineate a discourse concerned with a predefined region of being.
Instead, it refers to a discursive form of approach or strategy that is, in some sense, all inclusive.
Heidegger elaborates on this with a brief look into the etymological significance of the word
“phenomenology,” which comes to us from the Greek “φαινόμενον” [phenomenon] and “λόγος”
[logos]. He defines φαινόμενον as “what shows itself, the self-showing, the manifest.”106 And,
λόγος he defines as the “letting something be seen by indicating it.”107 Put together to form the
word phenomenology, the term means “to let what shows itself be seen from itself, just as it
shows itself from itself.”108 Thus, the phenomenological method consists, for Heidegger, in a
letting be seen wherein great care and attention is given to preserve and uncover a pure sense of
the meaning of things discussed as they are on their own terms.
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Phenomenology endeavors not to confine beings to a preconceived schema or region of
being, but instead strives to allow what is to speak for itself. This requires the withholding or
suspending of any and all potentially distorting presuppositions that might cover over the
phenomenon under consideration. For Edmund Husserl, the father of phenomenology, this
withholding is carried out in the form of bracketing or epoché [ἐποχή] and is captured in the now
famous slogan “back to the things themselves!” Heidegger adopts the spirit of this slogan, albeit
within the context of questioning-being rather than Husserl’s project of “build[ing] anew all the
sciences.”109
All of this is not to say that, Heidegger is able to simply adopt and maintain a completely
unbiased and disinterested position, one that is free of all prejudice, as if such a thing were even
possible. Part of what it means to exist, as Dasein, is to be embedded in a world and in a
meaningful context.110 By avoiding any definitive stance on being, the Heideggerian
phenomenologist does not entirely abandon her assumptions about being, instead she tries to
circumnavigate them in such a way that they do not hold the same determinative sway as before.
Epoché, for Heidegger, is a continuous struggle, not a prerequisite state of being.111 Remember,
Dasein is understood in terms of perpetual and active engagement with the world, its analysis
must not be seen as something static but temporal. If the analysis is phenomenological, then, we
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ought to think of the analysis as a process of bracket-ing, rather than something that occurs once
the bracketing is accomplished.
Part of the phenomenological struggle means incorporating, and even privileging,
otherwise excluded experiences. For Heidegger, our most intimate interactions with beings do
not take place at the height of scientific inquiry or theoretical brilliance, but in our ordinary,
unremarkable encounters with them. Beings are most free to be themselves, when we are dealing
with them in what might be called an “unthinking” manner. It is in our everyday dealings with
the beings of the world that we operate outside the formal limitations of scientific investigation
where beings present themselves without the constraints of a formal and conceptual discourse.
Therefore, because it is capable of operating outside the limits of the ontic sciences,
phenomenology reveals itself as the only appropriate method with which to carry out an
investigation into the basic conditions of existence and being—i.e. fundamental ontology. As
Heidegger explains, “Ontology is only possible as phenomenology.”112 Ultimately, Heidegger
wants to turn away from grandiose theory back towards our basic everyday experience, to be
attentive to what is always already there.
Heidegger elaborates on this return to the everyday with reference to two forms of innerworldly disclosure, what he calls the ready-to-hand [Zuhandenheit] (or handiness) and the
present-to-hand [Vorhandenheit]. The latter refers to the theoretical way being wherein beings
appear as objectively present objects made available for contemplation, while the former refers
to the way beings are disclosed in our active and engaged dealings in the world. Heidegger
prioritizes the ready-to-hand. For him, engaged action is the fundamental way by which we exist
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in the world—recall that care [Sorge] is the word he uses to characterize Dasein’s being-in-theworld.113 As he writes, “handiness [Zuhandenheit] is the ontological categorical definition of
beings as they are ‘in themselves.’”114 If we are to return to “the things themselves” it will likely
occur under the disclosive influence of the ready-to-hand. This is not to say that present-to-hand
observation of things provides no access to Dasein’s existential structures, nor that it is a
completely different way of being than the ready-to-hand. For, as Heidegger explains,
“observation is a kind of taking care just as primordially as action has its own kind of seeing.
Theoretical behavior is just looking, noncircumspectly.”115 The present-to-hand, therefore, is a
distinct form of active engagement with the world. What Heidegger does by prioritizing the
ready-to-hand is not to exclude the present-to-hand, but to incorporate it into the ready-to-hand.
Present-to-hand disclosure is but one mode of Dasein’s active engagement with the beings of the
world.
The present-to-hand encounter is a hyper focused encounter, one wherein blinders are
erected that block and narrow the phenomenon. It is a problem-solving mode. Things become
present-to-hand, for Heidegger, during a moment of breakdown. When the flow of our everyday
engagement is broken, the things that we are always already engaged with and taking care of are
suddenly disclosed as brute, objectively present “objects.” Heidegger illustrates this with an
example of a craftsman using a hammer.116 As long as the hammer is functioning well, and the
task is moving along unproblematically, the person using the hammer hardly has to think about
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it. It is only once the hammer breaks that it emerges as a thing, useful for hammering. Its
brokenness pulls it out of the ready-to-hand to stand present and objectifiable.
This does not mean that the present-to-hand is an entirely disinterested mode, but rather
that it marks a shift in Dasein’s careful being-in-the-world. We continue to engage with entities
at-hand (i.e. hammers), but in a new way. There is now a problem that must be solved. The
activity continues, but it is not the same; there is an obstruction, the flow of the ready-to-hand is
halted, and the being becomes an “object.” For Heidegger, this is indicative of the way by which
phenomenology differs from other forms of philosophic and scientific discourse. The ontic
sciences, which begin with objectively presents beings (as objects), function in the manner of a
problem-solving-disclosing. Their questions represent problems. Thus, they begin a step later
than phenomenology, after some kind of a breakdown has occurred and a problem encountered
(i.e. the Kantian scandal of reconciling the divide between the Cartesian subject and the world of
objects). It is not that the Heideggerian phenomenologist never begins under the light of a
philosophic problem, but that the she does not remain within the confines of that problem.
Instead, she strives to pull out of the limited context of the problem, back into the world, and the
wider context of existence in and by which the problem makes its appearance.
Ultimately, Heidegger’s emphasis on the priority of the ready-to-hand, on the active and
the everyday, means that Heidegger does not begin from axiomatic or self-evident propositions,
nor does his analysis move within the boundaries of a predefined problem. Instead, he opens up
to, and moves carefully through, unjudgmental descriptions of our everyday experience. To a
devoted scientific empiricist this is a dangerous move. For Heidegger’s account thereby risks
slipping into the arbitrariness of anecdotal evidence. By starting with the everyday, Heidegger’s
entire analysis seemingly stands and falls by the readers ability to sympathize with the
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description. If his descriptions resonate with the reader both can move forward together. If not,
the whole project falls apart. For the empiricist this dependence is sufficient grounds for
dismissing Heidegger’s project. Yet, we must not fall for this cheap rebuttal for two reasons. (1)
For one, the accusation that the existential analysis is founded on anecdotal grounds is only a
legitimate critique within the empirical scientific project and has little bearing on the task of
questioning being. (2) For two, the empirical scientific project is grounded on preconceived
metaphysical notions of, not only what it means to be human (as a subjective observer), but also
what it means to be at all. Heidegger’s task of raising the Seinsfrage cannot be subjected to such
banal criticism, for by its very nature, the question of being precedes and supports the grounds of
the discipline out of which the critique is extended.
Again, Heidegger is not looking to “know” the world, nor to provide “true” statements
about it. His descriptions of the world are not accomplishments but stepping stones; he is not
defining anything but trying to coax beings out into a more authentic light. Heidegger only wants
to raise the Seinsfrage. In the service of this aim, the existential analysis is necessarily
phenomenological. It is flexible, not limited to a set of assumptions or self-evident propositions.
Dasein itself, as the dynamic opening up, as the existential condition of possibility, demands this
form of approach. By withholding assumption and instead allowing beings to manifest
themselves, the phenomenologist is primed and ready to encounter the Dasein’s existential
structure.
At this point, however, it is still somewhat unclear as to how phenomenological
withholding is to take place. How does the phenomenologist come to embody the necessary
phenomenological disposition? Responding to this question, we ought to take note of the way by
which the analysis moves. In so doing, we ought to recognize that the process of bracket-ing
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assumption and getting to the core of the issue of Dasein’s being, is not a straight forward
procedure. The analysis is not a pointed, one-way, path. Instead it is a winding, circling,
repetitive journey. Recall Heidegger’s insistence that there is no circular reasoning involved in
working out the Seinsfrage, instead there is only a “relatedness backward or forward”117
As a discursive methodology, phenomenology can be characterized as fundamentally
expositional. As a distinct form of λόγος it “[lets] something be seen by indicating it.” The
phenomenologist analyzes their experience (for Heidegger, their existence) linguistically, by
giving phenomenal descriptions. In Heidegger’s case, he begins with a general, unjudgmental,
preliminary and ontic description of Dasein as the being that (in its being) understands being.118
Thinking through the implications of this, he arrives at the conclusion that this understanding of
being takes the form of being-in-the-world.119 Rethinking Dasein’s understanding of being in
light of its being-in-the-world, it is revealed that Dasein’s being-in-the-world is always already in
the mode of care [Sorge].120 Returning a third time, Heidegger considers Dasien’s understanding
of being in terms of the structure of care. Finally, he discovers that Dasein’s care structure is
fundamentally temporal and that ecstatic temporality is the structure that informs all existence
and opens the horizon of the meaning of being.121 From here, he returns to rethink his earlier
conclusions in light of ecstatic temporality.
Dennis Schmidt, in the introduction to the Joan Stambaugh translation of Being and
Time, describes Heidegger’s approach as a process of examination and reexamination that
“continually rewrites itself [and] repeatedly revisits earlier analyses in the light of their own
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conclusions.”122 By continually returning to go over the same ground, meditating on the same
occurrence, never deviating from it, and allowing it to slowly manifest itself, Heidegger finds
that the influence of assumption can be resisted and a more authentic disclosure made possible.
Interestingly, the German word “Analyse” has its roots in the Greek análusis [ἀνάλυσις], which
denotes “a loosening or a releasing” in the sense of unraveling.123 Phenomenology, carried out in
this way, is a kind of descriptive seeing that unravels the coverings of assumption. Lingering
over the same ground in this way, Heidegger exposes what is always already there, but was
previously hidden, covered over by the forgetful disclosure of the world that we, today, find
ourselves in. What is the result of this exposure?
To recap: we are trying to understand how the existential analysis of Dasein can
contribute to the project of working out the Seinsfrage. In so doing, we asked two basic
questions: what is existence? what is analysis? Engaging these questions, it was demonstrated
that Heidegger looks to expose the existential structure of Dasein, as the condition of possibility
of being, via a phenomenological approach. This approach is characterized by both a widened
perspective and a striving to be as unjudgmental as possible in the form of an unraveling. It is
carried out via repetitive and ever deepening descriptions that are intended to allow the beings
under investigation to reveal themselves on their own terms, rather than try to forcibly pull them
out of oblivion. While the question as to exactly how this phenomenological analysis leads to the
Seinsfrage remains open, there is beginning to emerge a sense of kinship between
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phenomenological analysis and questioning. Both involve a withholding of assumption, and an
active, striving resistance to the distorting influence of worldly disclosure.

Preparing/Questioning
Early on, we hinted at the fact that the existential analysis was but one part of a twofold
task: i.e. the task of working out the Seinsfrage. The two folds of this task are analytical and
destructive. Thus far, we have considered the existential analysis on its own terms. Now, we
ought to consider its relation to the destructive aspect of Heidegger’s project. For, as Heidegger
tells us, “the question of being attains true concreteness only when we carry out the destruction
[Destruktion] of the ontological tradition.”124
The analysis of Dasein is ostensibly just the beginning. It is preparatory. And indeed,
Heidegger makes this clear by titling the first chapter “The Exposition of the Task of a
Preparatory Analysis of Dasein [Die Exposition der Aufgabe einer vorbereitenden Analyse des
Daseins].”125 If we are to fully grasp the way by which the existential analysis serves to manifest
the Seinsfrage, we must consider its preparatory nature. Let us mediate on this now.
Our exploration into the nature of the analysis revealed that its aim is to allow the
existential structure of Dasein, as the condition of possibility of being, as disclosive opening onto
and into the world, to expose itself. The analysis has the character of a repetitive
phenomenological exposition that develops into the progressive withholding of assumption in
order to resist the distorting influence of our ways of being-in-the-world and uncover what is
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always already there. It begins from an initial impression (an otherwise obvious truth), then
slowly and carefully exposes the meaningful essence of that impression by continually and
repetitively going over and over it, giving ever deepening descriptions. In short, the analysis is a
way of unraveling letting-be-seen.
From the transcendentalist assumption that questioning is always a being-toward answer
(as opposed to being-out-from-answer), it looks as though the existential analytic is a preliminary
examination of the terrain on which the search for an answer is to take place. Just as one might
measure and mark the ground on which a building will be constructed, Heidegger is thought to
be examining the existential ground of Dasein in order to prepare for the constructive work of
building toward an answer (whether or not Heidegger intends to carry out such a construction is
unimportant). Indeed, this is how Richardson interprets preparatory nature of Heidegger’s
fundamental ontology.126 In a similar way, the transcendentalists interpret the work of the
analytic as preparatory to an answering, and in some cases (i.e. for Arendt, Braver, Caputo etc.),
as the answering itself.127 As mentioned earlier, Malpas considers the question of place to be
prior to the question of being, and the existential analysis, which answers the question of place,
to be preparatory to the question of being. From our own interpretation, however, the dynamic
here is subtly different. How are we to interpret the preparatory nature of the existential analytic
as it strives to question out-from-answer?
We commonly think of preparation as a three-stage process: (1) forethought, (2)
calculation, and (3) action. On this model, to be engaged in the activity of preparation is to look
ahead from the position of a now to a not-yet-now. By way of forethought (literally “thinking-
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before”), a preparer first establishes a field of vision wherein possibilities are projected onto the
not-yet-now and set into competition with one another. The preparer then makes a prediction
concerning the probability of each possible outcome. Informing this prediction is an implicit
understanding that the future is causally conditioned by the now. Things carry from the present
into the future in a cause-effect pattern, i.e. in a measurable and predictable manner. The present
is seen as a precursor, the antecedent, to a conditional future; a future that is, for now, only a
series of unactualized, but actualizable, possibilities. Of these future possibilities one stands out
as not only actualizable, but desirable. An analysis of this field is then carried out to gauge the
probability of this possible outcome, and the conditions required for it to become manifest.
Through this kind of calculation, weighing the benefits and disadvantages of each path and
possibility, the preparer selects the best action to achieve the desired outcome and avoid the
undesirable ones. After a choice of action has been made, it is then implemented. Of course, that
which is to be actualized cannot be guaranteed, or else preparations would not need to be made.
Preparing is not simply making predictions, nor is it looking ahead and hoping for the best.
Preparation culminates in the action we take, the arrangements we make now, situating and
positioning things, that are to causally carry into the not-yet-now. Preparation is active
organization.
This basic, every day concept of preparation is a matter of common sense. As such, it is
difficult to envision any other form of preparation. From this perspective, the existential analytic
of Dasein, understood as a preparatory procedure, is a combination of forethought, calculation,
and action. Framing the existential analysis in these terms, it can be said that Heidegger first
looks ahead to a future wherein we might be capable of posing the Seinsfrage, and then works to
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actualize this potential future. The question of being, from this view, is a not-yet realized
possibility that must be actively brought about; it resides in the future, we reside in the present.
We might wonder, though, if this is what Heidegger has in mind when he tells us that the
existential analytic is “preparatory” [vorbereitenden] to the Seinsfrage. As we have seen thus far,
the existential analysis is characterized as a phenomenological letting-be-seen. By resisting the
closure of Dasein’s disclosure, Heidegger hopes to allow the existential structure that runs
through our various possibilities of being to expose itself. Practicing phenomenal attentiveness,
Heidegger strives to circumnavigate assumption in order to free up what is always already there.
Moving toward the conclusion of the analysis is not moving toward a possibility that resides in
the future, but one that is coextensive with the existence of our Dasein, one that is always already
there. Thus, the preparation that Heidegger is actively carrying out is not the common
preparation of looking ahead and organizing, in a projective and calculative manner; rather, it is
the preparation of withholding and letting be; i.e. of bracket-ing.
We may recall that the forgetfulness that currently obstructs our path towards questioning
being is predicated upon an always already implicit understanding of being that traps us in a
vicious hermeneutic circle. This understanding, what we are calling an “answer” to the
Seinsfrage, is what is to be exposed via the existential analysis. And so, when Heidegger
explains that he is, “searching for the answer to the question of the meaning of being in general,
and above all the possibility of radically developing this basic question of all ontology,”128 we
must not think of this an act of being-toward-answer, but as a preparatory act of exposing the
horizon in which the question is constrained by an always already preconceived answer.
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Heidegger’s questioning is not predicated on a desire to settle on a definitive conclusion, but in
order to loosen its grip on us, to phenomenologically unravel it. The existential structure that is
exposed via the existential analysis does not represent the transcendental place of all places, but
the ecstatic transcendental condition of all possibilities that we are, today, in our time of
forgetfulness. Through this unraveling exposure, the Seinsfrage is both prepared and enacted.
In the end, the preparatory nature of the analysis is not merely organizational, nor is it
linear. It does not lead directly to the Seinsfrage (as if the question could be posed like a statue in
a museum); rather, by phenomenologically moving “backward and forward” over the ground of
existence, hermeneutically circling the answer that constrains the question, Heidegger looks to
embody a questioning that does not search for something predetermined, but is opened to the
radical possibility of a gifted ontological transformation. The act of preparing to receive is the act
of questioning-being, a readying receptiveness. Thus, the ecstatic temporal structure ought not be
thought of as final, but as yet another step on the road to such open receptiveness; something that
in turn will also be unraveled. Ecstatic temporality is but a path-mark on the way to continued
questioning, a questioning that takes phenomenological form.
Where does this leave our understanding of the unpublished second half of Being and
Time? For one, we can now see that the destructive component of the twofold task of working
out the Seinsfrage could not be carried out as an attack, launched from the stable ground of an
unchanging transcendental horizon. For any action carried out from the position of an answer to
the question of being, will only reiterate what it is trying to attack. Indeed, the destruction can
only occur via the loosening of questioning’s being-out-from-answer. Destruction is not the next
step of a step-by-step procedure but is folded into the two-fold preparations of phenomenological
exposition. In this way, the destruction occurs via the analysis itself and not after its
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“conclusion.” What this means is that the unpublished half of Being and Time, is not indicative
of a missing component but of a task accomplished earlier than anticipated. While it was, at the
outset, thought to be a necessary aspect of posing the Seinsfrage, through the analysis, and based
on the success of the analysis, the second half as originally envisioned comes to be unnecessary.
Thus, Dennis Schmidt is wrong when he characterizes Being and Time as the “torso of its own
intensions.”129 Heidegger’s intentions from the beginning have been to question being, and this is
what he does. The abandonment of the second half of Being and Time is not exemplary of
Heidegger’s failure, but his success. His realization that the second half was no longer necessary,
demonstrates the existential analysis effective loosening of our understanding of Being, such that
the task itself is transformed.

Recollection
This chapter began with the intention of clarifying the nature of Heidegger’s existential
analysis as preparatory to the goal of raising anew the Seinsfrage. As it turns out, the analysis is
not preparatory in the manner of a coming-before, but itself is an act of questioning. Its
phenomenological method, which takes the form of a continued effort to bracket assumption, is
the concrete expression of questioning’s letting be via a restrained-seeking that hearkens. To
question, therefore, is always to be on the move. Questioning is always preliminary and
preparatory. Questioning prepares for further questioning. It is a dynamic process whereby the
understanding that we live by is perpetually withheld. To question being, to pose the Seinsfrage,
is to open up to the radical possibility and freedom of being-there. It is to loosen the grip of the
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understanding of being [Seinsverständnis] that conditions us and the world we inhabit. It is to
remain open, awaiting, ready to receive being. It is to prepare for a radically transformed future.
Dasein, as the being that has the possibility of questioning in its being, lets beings be, and in
letting beings be, piously journeys toward the un-known.
The transcendentalist interpretation of Being and Time, by assuming that questions are
always being-toward-answer, rather than a being-out-from-answer, miss the radicality of
Heidegger’s project. Quite willing to settle on the existential structure of ecstatic temporality,
unquestioningly, the transcendentalist usurps Heidegger’s questioning and attempts to put it into
the service of some predefined project; i.e. knowing the world or deconstructing history. And, as
Heidegger is careful to point out, all such projects rely on a predefined, albeit largely implicit,
understanding of being. Thus, the transcendentalist, by interpreting Being and Time in this way,
closes down the questioning that Heidegger fought so hard to foster. Heidegger does not simply
want to carry out this questioning himself, but wants to inspire such questioning in us, his
readers. Being and Time is not a collection of statements, it is an invitation—an opening.
Reading it, we are invited to join him on his quest to question the meaning of being. Heidegger’s
questioning is dedicated to those that will come after him, those future thinkers that will carry on
questioning and in so doing continue to revolutionize our ways of thinking and being. As he will
later write in the Contributions to Philosophy, “the task is to prepare for these future ones.”130
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Conclusion
“Questioning is the piety of thought.”131

The foregoing investigation sought to address the question: what is Being and Time?
Consideration of this question led to a meditation on the nature of Heideggerian questioning and
the free possibility of the Seinsfrage. Let us now look back on the path we have traversed to see
what has been discovered.
In the first chapter, I set Being and Time up as a work of questioning. Reading closely the
opening lines of the text, I reflected on the nature of Heidegger’s task of raising anew the
question of the meaning of being [die Seinsfrage]. In particular, I examined Heidegger’s remarks
on the constraints that, today, hinder such questioning; namely, a forgetfulness of being.
Heidegger argues that to properly pose the question we must first reawaken [zu wecken] an
understanding of it. Reflecting on the nature of our forgetfulness and speculating on what this
“reawakening” might entail, I argued that to work out the Seinsfrage does not mean to answer it
but to bring it out from under the coverings of an always already functioning answer; i.e. a
conditioning understanding of questioning. For Heidegger, a more authentic understanding of the
question is hidden by presumption. I determined that to fully grasp what Heidegger is attempting
to do, we must be suspicious of our common assumptions regarding what questioning is and how
it functions. From here I argued that, for Heidegger, answers do not mark the culmination of a
successful questioning but serve as guides, opening and directing subsequent questioning.
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In the second chapter, beginning from the supposition that our common understanding is
misguided, I carried out an investigation into the nature of questioning as Heidegger presents it
in Being and Time. Following the hints established in the first chapter, as well as Heidegger’s
account of the formal structure of questioning [die Fragestellung], I argued that questioning is a
mode of Dasein’s existential occurrence. It is a way of being-in-the-world. As such, questioning
is a disclosive activity wherein the questioner lets beings be. I further characterized the
questioning mode of Dasein by examining some of Heidegger’s pointed remarks about it. I
concluded that questioning takes the form of a restrained-seeking, expressed discursively as a
hearkening. It is not merely to practice restraint but to become it. To question is to ontologically
open ourselves up to and clear the way for a free disclosive issuing of being. As Heidegger
writes in the Introduction to Metaphysics: “[Questioning is] the open resoluteness to be able to
stand in the openness of beings.”132
In questioning we move forward into the world in a uniquely self-possessed way. We do
not charge ahead, relentlessly projecting old and outdated assumptions, nor do we stop entirely,
adopting a position of complete disinterest. Instead, we sojourn. We meditate. We do not embark
on a frantic search, wherein everything is laid out in advance and the path followed is carefully
marked and well used. Instead, we move forward slowly, listening carefully and looking
attentively to beings as they present themselves. Questioning is a disclosive activity, wherein
beings are brought into being in such a way that they are freed to be themselves. This freeing
disclosure is not something that occurs in an instant and is finished, rather it is a durational,
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active occurrence, a dynamic opening up that must be upheld and perpetuated. It is not a onetime job, as simple as uttering some words and grasping at an answer.
From this general understanding of questioning, I then considered what it would mean to
question being. I argued that the Seinsfrage, has the potential to ignite a radical ontological
transformation. This potential is grounded in its position as an eminent question. The Seinsfrage
enjoys a level of precedence [Vorrang] that other questions are not privy to. It is a question to
which all other questions meaningfully defer. For any question to be posed concretely and
meaningfully, the question of being must be addressed first. In a sense, then, the Seinsfrage is the
question that resides closest to the ground of all questions. And since questioning functions by
way of a disclosive opening up, and a preparing to receive, the Seinsfrage is an opening up at the
ground level. It is preparatory to a complete transformation of the disclosure of ourselves and our
world. Such questioning, therefore, is no mere frivolity. For it has the power to incite radical
change and inspire creative newness. As Heidegger will declare in the sporadic and esoteric
Contributions to Philosophy, “in questioning resides the tempestuous advance that says ‘yes’ to
what has not been mastered and the broadening out into ponderable, yet unexplored, realms.”133
Of course, however, this transition from the old into the new is not a straight forward
movement. In fact, it is largely out of our hands. For everything that we think and do is carried
out under the influence of an implicit and preliminary understanding of being [Seinsverständnis].
This understanding is not something human beings create, but something we embody, something
that we are. It is the fundamental condition of our existence. It is a condition into which we are
thrown. Human beings never stand outside of a world, in order to craft an understanding of being
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and then be transported into one. Rather we always already find ourselves here, without knowing
how we got here. In a sense, our understanding of being is a gift. To questioningly open up and
prepare to receive a new understanding is to allow ourselves to be appropriated by being once
again, just as we were originally appropriated when we first entered into this world. Perhaps this
is what Heidegger means, therefore, when in The Essence of Truth, he claims that: “Questioning
is preparation for, and enabling of, a law-giving.”134
After establishing the nature of the Seinsfrage, I considered the method by which
Heidegger hoped to manifest it. Considering Heidegger’s claim that the Seinsfrage is forgetfully
hidden beneath the coverings of an already implicit understanding of being, I argued that the task
Heidegger sets himself is one of uncovering. The third chapter, therefore, explored what this
uncovering involves. I argued that to work out the question is not to pointedly dig beneath and
mine bellow our forgetful encounters, but to try and coax the question out on its own terms by
continually resisting and bracketing the assumptions that have thus far kept it covered.
Heidegger’s efforts to “work out” the question of the meaning of being, to “reawaken” it and
bring it out of the oblivion of for-get-fullness, are largely efforts to loosen up the grip of our
contemporary understanding of being.
Interpreting the existential analysis as Heidegger’s chosen path to this end, I considered
the way by which it was to accomplish this loosening. In so doing, I explored the
phenomenological character of the analysis, which I described as a process of continual
bracketing, whereby the phenomenologist strives to resist the closure of their own disclosure.
Heideggerian phenomenology, I argue, is an expositional process in which the phenomenologist
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repetitively examines the existential ground of an issue, over and over, in a way designed to free
up the “things themselves” to allow them to occur on their own terms. In this way, questioning,
as a restrained-seeking that hearkens, maintains a close kinship to the process of
phenomenology. In fact, to question is to practice phenomenology. And so, while Heidegger
presents Being and Time as preparatory to questioning, the text itself is an example of
questioning in action. As such, we ought not interpret the text as a doctrinal contribution to
philosophy, something to be accepted and espoused. For it does not intend to provide answers
but serve as a guide to our own questioning and a provisional foundation for further questioning.
Thus, I argue that the existential structure of Dasein, as ecstatic temporality, should not
be read in any absolute terms. It is not a universal condition of all possibility but is the
fundamental horizon of our world today. Engaging the interpretations given by Jeff Malpas and
John D. Caputo, I argued that the transcendental interpretation of Being and Time is a misreading
of the text encouraged by an unquestioned assumption that questioning is a striving, beingtoward-answer. Ecstatic temporality, as the horizon in which our shared world is situated,
represents the implicit understanding of being that we all live by. It is the condition of all our
possibilities. Hidden by its more vulgar expressions, ecstatic temporality carries on unthought
and unquestioned. Heidegger’s phenomenological analysis of existence, by revealing temporality
as the existential ground of contemporary Dasein, hopes to question out-from it; that is, to leap
out (to be thrown) into a new horizon by way of an appropriation. Questioning does not settle on
the horizon of ecstatic temporality but moves through and out from it. Heidegger does not arrive
there, close his questioning, and then publish his findings in a collection of statements titled
Being and Time. Rather, by allowing the ground to emerge, Heidegger prepares to leave it
behind.
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And so, in response to our leading question, I argue that Being and Time is the opening of
a radical questioning. It is a movement not a destination. Its path is more important than the
(re)marks made along the way. In full awareness of our limitations and constraints, Heidegger
explores the possibility of circumnavigating our situation in order to overcome it. His quest is
one of emancipation. The text itself does not represent a finished product, but an invitation to
join him on his way. The nature of this quest is such that he cannot provide a clear-cut map for
us to follow. For any such map will undoubtedly be constrained by the horizon of a limited
understanding of being. Nonetheless, Heidegger, in and through his work, attempts to light the
way into the unknown—to open the door that we ourselves must step through. As Heidegger
says in the Contributions to Philosophy, “the issue is neither to describe nor to explain, neither to
promulgate nor to teach. Here the speaking is not something over and against what is to be said
but is this latter itself as the essential occurrence of beyng.”135 Heidegger wants to inspire
questioning, to instigate a lifelong revolution of thought. The committed labour of questioning’s
Ausarbeitung is a vocational calling. It is not a one-time job to be accomplished and set aside,
but something that we must return to again and again, striving to keep ourselves open to the
radical possibility of being-there as witnesses to the unfolding of being. What, then, is Being and
Time? It is the initiation of a revolution.136
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By clarifying the nature of Heideggerian questioning, I hope to counteract a tendency in
Heidegger scholarship to focus on the content of Heidegger’s work rather than the path that it
opens. If Heidegger is truly concerned with questioning, then anything he says along the way is
not definitive but preparatory. And so, while there have been a number of different
interpretations of Being and Time over the near century since its initial publication, few have
appreciated the truly revolutionary ambitions of his questioning.
It is by questioning, constantly moving forward, perpetually opening up to the unknown
and preparing to receive, that Heidegger hopes to ignite a revolution of thought and being. He is
not looking to contribute to an already established discourse, nor to add to an already ongoing
conversation. He is looking to transform discourse altogether. Heidegger is a revolutionary in the
most radical sense.

Heidegger’s philosophy, he says, “is solely and exclusively about meaningfulness and its source” (Making Sense of
Heidegger: A Paradigm Shift, 10).
To make this move, however, largely ignores the nature of Heidegger’s questioning. He is not attempting
to define being (as meaningfulness or anything else), but to inspire us to question it. As per the ontological
difference, being cannot be defined. By arguing that being is meaning, Sheehan closes the door to our own
questioning. By “making sense” of Heidegger, and reducing his provisional claims to definitive statements, he
settles the issue. There is no longer any need to question, for we now “understand” what Heidegger was all about.
While it is certainly true that Heidegger has lots to say about the nature of interpretation (his work was instrumental
to the hermeneutic philosophy of his student Hans Georg Gadamer, for example), what he says is incidental to his
way of saying it, and especially to the questioning that informs and shapes such saying.
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